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Why Copyrights Are Not Community Property
Dane S. Ciolino"
This Article argues that copyrights created during the legal regime of
community property are the separate property of the author-spouse.
Although community property law purports to vest ownership of all
property-including copyrights-in both spouses in the community,
federal copyright law vests ownership of copyrights solely in the author.
Given this conflict, federal law preempts state community property law
on the issue of initial vesting of copyright ownership. Furthermore, no
provision of state community property law purports to transfer vested
copyrights from the author to the community. Indeed, no state law could
do so, given that federal law prohibits most involuntary copyright
transfers. Arguing that federal classification of copyrights as the
separate property ofthe author-spouse is fair, this Article concludes that
such classification is essential not only to further important interests
advanced by community property law, but also to comply with the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 1976' provides that the ownership of a copyrighted work
vests initially in its author.' Thus, a screenwriter, novelist or artist who creates a
work becomes the owner of that work as soon as he fixes it in a screenplay,
manuscript, painting or other tangible medium of expression. As the copyright
owner, the author is free to exploit his work through making and distributing copies
and adaptations, through publicly performing or displaying the work,3 through
granting licenses, or through transferring copyright ownership.'
However, the issue of copyright ownership becomes more complicated, as do
so many things, upon marriage. Community property law provides that ownership
of things acquired during marriage through the labor of a spouse vests in the
community rather than in the separate patrimony of the laboring spouse.' Thus, a
welder, banker or lawyer who earns a salary at his job typically shares ownership
of that income with his spouse. Although this is clear, who owns the copyrights
created through the labors of a screenwriter, novelist or artist? Under community
property law, the answer is simple: both spouses in the community. Under
copyright law, the answer is likewise simple: the author alone. In these two simple
answers lies a difficult problem.
How the law resolves this conundrum can have significant economic
consequences upon the termination of an author's marriage. Consider, for
example, one screenwriter, one novelist, and one artist. Screenwriter Gene
Roddenberry divorced his first wife in 1969 just after his then-unsuccessful
television series, Star Trek, had been canceled by NBC after a miserable three-
season run." Apparently assuming that all copyrights in the series were community
property, Mr. and Mrs. Roddenberry agreed to allocate the copyrights to Mr.
Roddenberry and to allocate a "one-half interest" in future Star Trek profits to Mrs.
Roddenberry. s Since then, Mrs. Roddenberry has received well over $13 million
in Star Trek revenues.9 Similarly, Wanda Clancy sought a share of $190 million
I. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1996 and Supp. 1999).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1996) (initial ownership of copyright).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996) (enumerating exclusive rights in copyrighted works).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1996) (transfer of copyright ownership).
5. See John Gray, Men are From Mars, Women are From Venus (1992).
6. La. Civ. Code art. 2338.
7. See Roddenberry v. Roddenbery, 51 Cal. Rpt'. 2d 907, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1996).
8. Id.
9. See Bob Egelko, "Star Trek " Creator's First Wife Denied Profits From Show Spinoffs Afler
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dollars in publishing revenues earned during her
20-year marriage to novelist Tom Clancy.
Among other things, Mrs. Clancy demanded a
share of "all 'intellectual property,' including
[Mr. Clancy's] most famous character Jack
Ryan." The prospect of sharing future book
revenues with his ex-wife prompted the novelist
to begin "plotting to bump [Jack Ryan] off."'
Finally, and closer to home, Veronica H.
Rodrigue sought to have the copyright in a Blue
Dog character" created by her ex-husband,
Lafayette artist George G. Rodrigue, classified as
community property so that she could recover a Absolute Rodrigue
share of the profits garnered from his creation of
Blue Dog artworks in the years following their 1992 divorce.'2
Although copyright ownership as between spouses can be financially signifi-
cant, uncertainty on this issue abounds. Courts have reached different conclusions
regarding spousal co-ownership of copyrighted works." Commentators have
disagreed about the nature and extent of the problem and, in so doing, have sug-
gested a range of proposed solutions." Moreover, most courts and commentators
Divorce, L.A. Daily News, Aug. I, 1996, at NI 1. A California appellate court held that the agreement
between Mr. and Mrs. Roddenberry to share profits was not intended to cover profits generated by Star
Trek spin-offs, but only those generated by the original television series. Id.; see also Roddenberry, 51
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907.
10. Breaking Up is Hard to Do, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 2, 1998, at 2A; see also Tom
Clancy 's Cold War: The Author's Divorce Involves a Custody Dispute Over a Fictional Character,
Greensboro News & Rec., Aug. 9,1990, at DI 6 ("who gets custody of Tom Clancy's] literary alter ego,
Jack Ryan"). While the state in which the Clancys' dispute arose, Maryland, is not a community
propertyjurisdiction-it is an "equitable distribution" jurisdiction, see id., many related issues arise in
allocating copyrights and copyright revenues upon termination of an author's marriage.
II. See Figure I (George G. Rodrigue, Absolute Rodrigue).
12. See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. La. 1999). The author represented Mr.
Rodrigue's former business associate, Richard Steiner, in related claims joined in this litigation.
13. Compare Worth v. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 139-40 (Cal. Ct. App. Ist Dist. 1987)
(copyrights are community property) with Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (copyrights are not
community property).
14. See 2 Matthew Bender& Co., Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property § 23.07 (1998);
1 Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 4.4.4.2 (2d ed. 1998); I Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer
on Copyright §§ 6A.O -6A.04 (1996); Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community
Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. Rev. 153 (1995); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., When an Author's Marriage
Dies: The Copyright-Divorce Connection, 37 J. Copyright Soc'y 382 (1990); David Nimmer,
Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 383 (1988);
William F. Patry, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 Bull. Copr.
Soc'y 237 (1981) (also published at 8 Comm. Prop. J. 205 (198 1)); Michael J. Perlstein, Copyright as
Community Property: Questions About Worth are More Than Merely Trivial, 9 Ent. L. Rep. 3 (1988);
Debora Polacheck, The "Un-Worth-Y"Decision: The Characterization ofa Copyrightas Community
Property, 17 Hastings Comm./Ent. L.J. 601 (1995); Peter J. Wong, Asserting the Spouse's Community
Property Rights in Copyright, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 1087 (1995); Note, Carla M. Roberts, Worthy of
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have failed to address critical constitutional issues presented by the problem and
to distinguish issues relating to initial copyright vesting from those relating to
subsequent copyright transfer. Finally, no commentator has considered the peculiar
issues presented in this context by Louisiana's community property system.
This Article explores why copyrights created by an author subject to the legal
regime of community property are the separate property of that author. Although
Louisiana community property law purports to vest ownership of copyrights in both
spouses in the community, federal copyright law vests ownership solely in the
author-spouse. Given this conflict, Part H1 argues that federal copyright law
preempts Louisiana community property law on the issue of initial vesting of
copyright ownership." Furthermore, no provision of Louisiana community
property law purports to transfer vested copyrights from the author to the
community. As explained in Part I, no state law could do so given that federal
law prohibits most involuntary copyright transfers.I' Because federal classification
of copyrights as the separate property of the author-spouse is fair, Part IV
concludes that such classification is essential not only to further important interests
advanced by community property law, but also to comply with the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution.17
II. AUTHORS, SPOUSES, AND INmAL VESTING OF COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
Under Louisiana community property law, all things acquired through the
industry of either spouse vest initially in the patrimonial mass comprising the
community of acquets and gains.' Under federal copyright law, however, all
copyrights vest initially in the "author" of the work. 9 This Part addresses the
initial vesting of copyrights as between authors and spouses subject to the legal
regime. In so doing, it evaluates the apparent conflict between state law and
federal law on the issue of copyright vesting, and considers whether federal
copyright law preempts state community property law.
A. Copyright Vesting Under Community Property Law
Louisiana's community property system is a set of principles and rules
governing the ownership and management married persons' property.2" Formally
Rejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100 Yale L.J. 1053 (1991).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Infra Part Ill.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See La. Civ. Code art. 2338; id. art. 2336, cmt. c ("The community of acquets and gains is
not a legal entity but a patrimonial mass, that is, a universality of assets and liabilities."); Matthew
Bender, supra note 14, § 20.01l[1 ], at 20-7 ("the community is not regarded as a legal entity separate
and apart from the spouses composing it").
19. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1996) ("Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the author or authors of the work.").
20. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2325-2337.
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denominated by the Louisiana Civil Code as the "legal regime of community of
acquets and gains,"'" these principles apply to all spouses domiciled in Louisiana
who fail to opt out through a matrimonial agreement.' Under the legal regime,
property typically is classified as "either community or separate," with each spouse
owning a "present and undivided one-half interest in the community property."'
The community property regime has a long history both in Europe and in
Louisiana. Although many principles of Louisiana family law stem from Roman
sources, the community property system traces its roots to Visigothic Spain.24
From there, it branched to Spain's New World colonies including Louisiana, which
was under Spanish colonial rule from the signing of the Peace of Paris in 1 7631,
until retrocession to France in the 1800 Treaty of San Ildefonso.' Hence,
Louisiana's community property system descends directly from Spanish law rather
than from French or Roman law.27
The policy rationale undergirding Louisiana's longstanding community
property system is spousal equality." Particularly, the system reflects the
legislative judgment that spouses metaphorically are partners in a family enterprise
who should share equally in the fruits of their combined efforts. 9  Thus,
21. La. Civ. Code art. 2327; id. art. 2334.
22. See La. Civ. Code art. 2334 ("The legal regime of community of acquets and gains applies
to spouses domiciled in this state, regardless of their domicile at the time of marriage or the place of
celebration of the marriage."). On opting out of the legal regime through a matrimonial agreement, see
La. Civ. Code arts. 2328-2333.
23. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2334-2336.
24. See William Q. de Funiak & Michael J. Vaughn, Principles of Community Property § 1, at
3 (2d ed. 1971); id. § 7; 3 Marcel Planiol & George Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law, pt. 2, ch. I, no.
89 1, at 74 (La. St. L. Inst. trans., I I th ed. 1959) ("It is most probable that the community system came
into being in the late Middle Ages, perhaps between the 8th and 10th centuries."); id. no. 889, at 73
(community property law not of Roman origin); see also Richard A. Ballinger, A Treatise on the
Property Rights of Husband and Wife, Under the Community or Gananical System § I (1895)
(discussing the Spanish origins of community property); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.01,
at 6A-2 n.2.
25. See Light Townsend Cummins, By the Stroke of a Pen: Louisiana Becomes Spanish, in
Louisiana: A History 52 (Bennett H. Wall ed., 2d ed. 1990).
26. See Light Townsend Cummins, The Final Years of Colonial Louisiana, in Louisiana: A
History 82-83 (Bennett H. Wall ed., 2d ed. 1990); see also I Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave,
Matrimonial Regimes § 1.1 in 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1997).
27. See, e.g., Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.46, at 175; Nina N. Pugh, The Spanish
Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad de Gananciales, 30 La. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1969); deFuniak &
Vaughn, supra note 24, § 37, at 55 ("the Spanish law displaced the French law in the Louisiana
territory, and although France later regained that territory from Spain, it was sold to us so soon after the
French repossession that the Spanish law was still in force"); Matthew Bender, supra note 14, §
20.01 [3)[a], at 20-11 (Louisiana "relies on a community property system based largely upon Spanish
law.").
28. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.2, at 47 ("From the earliest times, the most
important legislative policy underpinning the Louisiana community property regime has been that
spouses share equally 'the produce of the reciprocal labor and industry of both husband and wife."').
29. See Matthew Bender, supra note 14, § 20.01[l I), at 20-7 ("the community is analogous to a
partnership in which the spouses are equal partners"); deFuniak & Vaughn, supra note 24, § 11. 1, at
1999]
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community property exists largely to recognize and respect the contributions made
by each working spouse, irrespective of whether he or she works within the home
or elsewhere."
Given this rationale, not all property in the possession of a spouse during the
legal regime is classified as community property.3 Indeed, property acquired
through means other than spousal labor during the marriage is often classified as
separate property. For example, things acquired prior to the establishment of the
legal regime or through individual inheritance or donation are classified as separate
property.3" The "very nub" of the Spanish community property system adopted by
Louisiana is that whatever is earned by the spouses during the marriage "belong[s]
to both by halves."'3
Copyrights created by an author-spouse during marriage would seem to fit
within the category of "community property'-at least as that category is delimited
by Louisiana law. The logic appears straightforward enough: all copyrighted works
are property;3' all property acquired during the legal regime through the labor of a
spouse is community property; ergo, all copyrights acquired during the legal regime
through the labor of an author-spouse are community property.31 Thus, when a
24; 3 Planiol & Ripert, supra note 24, pt. 2, ch. 1, no. 894, at 76 (community property regime developed
as "a special kind of partnership"); Id. ch. 2, no. 901, at 82 (community property regime is a "property
partnership between spouses"); Ann L Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of
Law and Economics, 36 Win. & Mary L Rev. 989, 1053-54 (1995) ("Where property division is
concerned, the image of marriage as a partnership has been deployed in support of relatively equal
division of 'marital assets."'); Wong, supra note 14, at 1095 ("Community property is based on the
theory that the marital community is a partnership between husband and wife.").
30. See Roberts, supra note 14, at 1059 (goal of community property is to "recognize in economic
terms the contribution ofnonbreadwinner spouses").
31. See Ballinger, supra note 24, at 4 (the civil law system "regards the husband and wife as
distinct persons, with separate rights and capable of holding distinct and separate estates").
32. See La. Civ. Code art. 2338; id. art. 2341. Thus, Louisiana's gananical system ofcommunity
of acquets and gains differs markedly from the traditional French model of"community of movables
and acquets." Under that system, all movables owned by both spouses at the time of marriage became
community property. In contrast, under the Spanish gananical system of "acquets and gains," the
spouses retain the things that they owned prior to the marriage as separate property. See Spaht &
Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.46, at 175; Pugh, supra note 27, at I. France ultimately adopted a
gananical system in 1965. See Robert L. Mennell & Thomas M. Boykoff, Community Property in a
Nutshell 11 (1988).
33. deFuniak & Vaughn, supra note 24, § 66, at 140.
34. Copyrights, as "assets that are exchangeable with a value determined by the market," are
"property" even under the most restrictive use of the term. See Estin, supra note 29, at 1056. See, e.g.,
Monslow v. Monslow, 912 P.2d 735, 744 (Kan. 1996) ("Copyrights ... generally are regarded as
property."); I Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.02[A], at 6A-4; Patry, supra note 14, at 240("Copyright is generally regarded as a form of property.").
35. 2 Matthew Bender, supra note 14, § 23.07[l 1, at 23-135 ("From a functional perspective,
intellectual property is indistinguishable from other marital property assets subject to division at
dissolution. Like other marital assets, intellectual property is acquired by the labor of one of the
spouses."); see Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.02[A][3], at 6A-6 (given that copyright law
creates a property interest, "it follows that such works, if qualified with respect to the time and manner
of acquisition or creation, fall within the ambit of community property").
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copyright comes into existence,36 it vests in the community patrimonial mass in
which the spouses have "present, equal, and existing interests."" Perhaps as a
result of the apparent validity of this syllogism, every court that has considered this
issue has so held as a matter of state community property law." Irrespective of the
soundness of this syllogism, federal law precludes its application to copyrights.39
B. Copyright Vesting Under Federal Law
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, "[c]opyright in a work protected under this
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work."'4 Initial vesting of
copyright ownership occurs at the moment the author creates a work by fixing it for
the first time in a tangible medium of expression.4 Once vested, the bundle of
rights known collectively as "the copyright" gives the author the exclusive rights
to reproduce, to adapt, to distribute, to perform publicly, and to display publicly the
copyrighted work.42
Federal copyright law vests all copyrights in "authors" and not in nonauthor-
spouses. An "author" is the person to whom the work "owes its origin," its
"originator" or "maker." '43 To qualifysas an "author," a person must contribute
36. A copyright comes into existence when an author fixes an original work of authorship in a
tangible medium ofexpression. See. e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996). Once created, the copyright gives
the author the exclusive right to reproduce, to adapt, to distribute, to perform publicly and to display
publicly the copyrighted work. Id. at § 106(a) (Supp. 1999).
37. Matthew Bender, supra note 14, § 20.02ll[b][i], at 20-19 ("From the moment community
property is acquired, the interests ofthe husband and wife in the community property are present, equal,
and existing interests."); see La. Civ. Code art. 2336 ("Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half
interest in the community property.").
38. See, e.g., Worth v. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1987);
Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55F. Supp. 2d 534,538 (E.D. La. 1999); Matthew Bender, supra note 14, at 23-
135 ("In recent years, all state courts that have addressed the issue have either assumed or have
explicitly held that copyrights, and the royalties therefrom, are marital (or community) property to the
extent that the copyrighted work or profits therefrom were generated by spousal labor during
marriage.").
39. The fallacious nature of the argument lies not in its structure, but rather in the soundness of
its minor premise. See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers 68-69 (3d ed. 1997).
("Validity deals only with form. It has absolutely nothing to do with content. Arguments, therefore.
may be logically valid, yet absolutely nonsensical.") Particularly, the premise "all property acquired
during the legal regime through the labor of a spouse is community property," is false: some property
acquired during the legal regime through spousal labor is classified as separate property by federal law.
See infra Part ll.B.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1996). See generally Marshall Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law
§ 5.1, at 147 (2d ed. 1995); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 5.01(A]; I William F. Patry,
Copyright Law and Practice 359 (1994).
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1996);seealso WilliamS. Strong, TheCopyrightBook: APractical
Guide 35 (4th ed. 1993) ("Copyright comes into existence at the moment of a work's creationjust as,
in some theologies, the soul enters the body at birth. At that time ownership vests in the author or
authors.").
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1-6) (1996 and Supp. 1999).
43. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 58, 4 S. Ct. 279, 283 (1884);
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significant copyrightable expression to a work." One who merely contributes
ideas, concepts or other noncopyrightable elements is not an "author" in whom
copyright can vest.s Likewise, a person who contributes financially toward the
creation of a work is not an "author" of that work." Therefore, federal law does
not permit vesting of copyright ownership in a nonauthor-spouse merely because
she may have contributed ideas, concepts or partner-like financial and emotional
support that facilitated the creation of a copyrighted work by the author-spouse. 7
C. Copyright Vesting and Federal Preemption
Although Louisiana law would vest copyrights in the community, federal law
would vest them solely in the author-spouse. Put in civilian terms, although
Louisiana community property law would vest the real rights in copyrighted works
in the patrimonial mass of community property, federal copyright law would vest
all copyrights solely in the patrimonial mass of the author-spouse. Given this
conflict, which law governs?
I. Preemption Generally
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the
"Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land."' Since Chief Justice
Marshall's 1819 opinion in M'Culloch v. Maryland," federal courts have relied
upon the Supremacy Clauseso to preempt state laws that conflict with federal laws
Committee for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,737, 109 S. Ct. 2166,2172 (1989) ("the
author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates the idea into a fixed,
tangible expression entitled to copyright protection").
44. See. e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1067-71 (7th Cir. 1994); M.G.B.
Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486,1493 (11 th Cir. 1990); Napoli v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 858 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. IlI. 1994); Balkin v. Wilson, 863 F. Supp. 523,527 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
See generally Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6.07, at 6-23--6-27.
45. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 41, at 35 ("the 'idea person' cannot claimjoint authorship simply
on the bases of having contributed ideas, no matter how original or how critical to the work's success").
46. See Nimmer & Nimmner, supra note 14, § 6.07, at 6-25. Of course, the Copyright Act by its
terms denominates employers and certain other commissioners of works as "author(s] for purposes of
this title." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1996).
47. See Matthew Bender, supra note 14, § 23.07[3][b], at 23.144 ("there is no evidence of any
congressional intent to accord authorship status to the 'nonauthor' spouse").
48. U.S. Const. art. VI.
49. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
50. Forjudicial opinions suggesting that preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause,
see Gade v. National Solid Waste Mgm't Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 108, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992);
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,211 (1825) ("acts of the State Legislatures... [that] interfere
with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress" are preempted because "the act of Congress ... is
supreme"). For commentators who question the notion that preemption is rooted in the Supremacy
Clause, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767 (1994); S.
Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause,
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and regulations.5 While every preemption analysis ultimately presents delicate
federalism issues regarding the allocation of power between the federal government
and the states,52 as a practical matter, preemption turns on whether Congress,.in
enacting a particular federal statute, intended to invalidate related or conflicting
state laws." Congress can manifest an intent to preempt either expressly or
impliedly: preemption "is compelled" when "Congress' command is explicitly
stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose."S'
While express preemption is relatively straightforward, "implied" preemption
is more problematic.55 The Supreme Court has recognized two varieties of
"implied" preemption, namely "field preemption," and "conflict preemption."'
"Field preemption" exists when "the scheme of federal regulation is 'so pervasive
as to make reasonable inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it."' 7 "Conflict preemption" exists either when "'compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,'" or when state law,
"'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.' 59
24 Conn. L. Rev. 829 (1992).
51. See Chester James Antieau & William J. Rich, Modern Constitutional Law § 43.17, at 33 (2d
ed. 1997).
52. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies § 5.2.1, at 287 (1997).
53. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485,116 S. Ct. 2240,2250 (1996) (quoting
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103,84 S. Ct. 219 (1963)) ("'The purpose of Congress is
the ultimate touchstone' in every preemption case."); Gade, 505 U.S. at 96, 112 S. Ct. at 2381 ("The
question of whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent.");
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1910 (1985) (the "purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone" of any preemption analysis); see also Malone v. White Motor
Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S. Ct. 1185, 1190 (1978). See generally Lawrence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988) ("the question whether federal law in fact preempts
state action in any given case necessarily remains largely a matter of statutory construction"); Antieau
"& Rich, supra note 5 1, § 43.18, at 36; Chemerinsky, supra note 52, § 5.2. 1, at 285-86; John E. Nowak
& Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 9.1, at 319 (5th ed. 1995).
54. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98, 112 S. Ct. at 2383 (citations omitted).
55. See Chemerinsky, supra note 52, § 5.2.1, at 284 ("As in so many other areas ofconstitutional
law, there is no clear rule for deciding whether a state or local law should be invalidated on preemption
grounds.").
56. Id. at 285. The Gade test "has been frequently repeated by the Court." Id. at 286.
57. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98,112 S. Ct. at 2383 (citations omitted). See generally Antieau & Rich,
supra note 51, § 43.17, at 35; id. §43.20, at 44; Chemerinsky, supra note 52, § 5.2.3, at 291; Tribe,
supra note 53, § 6-27; Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines,
44 S.C. L. Rev. 187, 193-94 (1993); Gardbaum, supra note 50, at 811.
58. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98,112 S. Ct. at 2383; see also Florida Lime &Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217 (1963).
59. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98, 112 S. Ct. at 2383; see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67,61 S. Ct.
399, 404 (1941); see also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649, 91 S. Ct. 1704, 1711 (1971). See
generally Antieau & Rich, supra note 51, § 43.19, at 44; Tribe, supra note 53, § 6-26, at 481; Karen




The United States Supreme Court has considered a number of preemption
cases involving the relationship between federal law and state marital property law.
In word, the Court has been most respectful of state law. Stating that "the whole
subject of domestic relations" law "belongs to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States,"' the Court has held that state "family-property law must
do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy
Clause will demand that state law will be overridden."' In deed, however, the
Court has been less than deferential toward state family law. On the contrary, state
marital property law in general, and Louisiana community property law in
particular, have fared poorly against federal law in past Supreme Court preemption
cases.
62
Although the Supreme Court and numerous lower courts have addressed
preemption issues in the context of state marital property law, few courts have
considered whether federal copyright law preempts state community property law.
Moreover, those which have considered the issue have reached different
conclusions. Compare, for example, a California appellate court's opinion in
Worth v. Worth,"3 with a federal district court's opinion in Rodrigue v. Rodrigue."
In Worth, the court considered whether copyrights in trivia books authored by Mr.
Worth during his marriage to Mrs. Worth were separate property or community
property under California law. Noting that the Copyright Act permits some
involuntary transfers of copyrights, the court held that "nothing is found in the Act
60. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94, 10 S. Ct. 850, 853 (1890).
61. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 99 S. Ct. 802, 808 (1979) (quoting United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352, 86 S. Ct. 500, 507 (1966)). See generally Wong, supra note 14,
at 1099.
62. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833,117 S. Ct. 1754(1997) (ERISA preempts Louisiana
community property law); Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S. Ct. 2023 (1989) (ownership of
nondisability military retirement pay governed by federal law); Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 572, 995 S. Ct.
at 802 (ownership of benefits under federal Railroad Retirement Act governed by federal law); Free v.
Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S. Ct. 1089 (1962) (ownership of United States savings bonds governed by
federal law); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 70 S. Ct. 398 (1950) (ownership of veterans' life
insurance benefits governed by federal law); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382, 26 S. Ct. 78 (1905)
(ownership of land possessed pursuant to federal homestead laws governed by federal law); see also
Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534,537 (E.D. La. 1999) ("community property law has not fared
well in preemption battles"). See generally 2 Matthew Bender, supra note 14, § 23.07(3], at 23-140
("While the literal language of federal preemption doctrine would appear to give wide berth to state
family law regulation, recent Supreme Court decisions have in fact held state marital property law
preempted on the basis of relatively weak inferences drawn from the federal provisions."); Nimmer &
Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.03[A], at 6A-14 ("The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that federal laws pre-empt conflicting provisions of state community property laws."); Spaht &
Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.40, at 147 ("The United States government, under the Supremacy Clause,
may and frequently does override state property law in regulating the property interests, entitlements
and institutions that it establishes."). Perhaps not surprisingly, state family law has fared better in
preemption cases decided in state rather than federal courts. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14,
§ 6A.03[A], at 6A-I 5-6AI6.
63. 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 139-40 (Cal. Ct. App. Ist Dist. 1987).
64. 55 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. La. 1999).
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which either precludes the acquisition of a community property interest by a
spouse, or which is otherwise inconsistent with community property law."65 In
Rodrigue, the court considered whether copyrights in art works authored by Mr.
Rodrigue during his marriage to Mrs. Rodrigue were separate property or
community property under Louisiana law." In sharp contrast to Worth, the
Rodrigue court held that "[a]ny community property ownership provision... that
permits copyright ownership to vest initially in anyone other than the author is...
preempted."67 A conflict-preemption analysis demonstrates that there are as many
reasons to commend the reasoning in Rodrigue as to discount that in Worth."
2. Conflict Preemption
Congress has not "expressly" preempted the application of community
property law on the issue of initial vesting of copyrights. While Section 301 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 expressly preempts all state laws creating "legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights" of copyright,"
that section does not expressly preempt state laws that merely affect works
protected under federal law. 76 Likewise, as to "field" preemption, Congress has not
so occupied the realm of copyright that no room exists for states to regulate matters
pertaining to copyrighted works of authorship.7' Thus, if the Copyright Act is to
65. Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139; see also In reMaiageofHeinze,631 N.E.2d 728,731 (111.Ct.
App. 3d Dist. 1994) (although it did not specifically address the preemption issue, the court noted
generally, "we find persuasive the legal reasoning of the court in Worth").
66. See Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
67. Id.
68. The Worth opinion should have little import in Louisiana. First, and most obviously, the case
is not controlling because it was rendered by a California state court applying California law. Second,
the opinion was, by the court's own admission, moot when it was decided. See Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr.
135, 135 n. 1; see also Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.02[AJ[3], at 6A-7 n.21 (" Worth itself
was moot when decided."). Third, the state court that decided Worth arguably lacked jurisdiction to
decide the issue of copyright ownership, given that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate copyright matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (Supp. 1999); Perlstein, supra note 14, at 5.
Fourth, given that the Worth court considered neither the scheme of the Copyright Act nor its legislative
history nor its jurisprudence, the opinion was inadequately researched and poorly reasoned. For these
reasons, it is perhaps not surprising that Worth has been roundly criticized by nearly all commentators
who have thoughtfully analyzed it. See, e.g., Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.02; Nevins,
supra note 14, at 398 (characterizing Worth as a "travesty on judicial reasoning"); Nimmer, supra note
14; Roberts, supra note 14. But see Nayo, supra note 14.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. 1999).
70. See Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41; Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.03 [A], at
6A-14 n.1 (Section 301 applies only to "state laws that accord copyright-like protection to works of
authorship"); see also Scott M. Martin & Peter W. Smith, The Unconstitutionality of State Motion
Picture Film Lien Laws (or How Spike Lee Almost Lost It), 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 59,86 (1989) (arguing
that Section 301 does not expressly prohibit states from permitting and enforcing security interests in
copyrighted works of authorship).
71. See Antieau & Rich, supra note 51, § 44.62, at 264-65 ("In general terms, states retain
concurrent authority to enact laws that affect... copyrights ... when they have not been precluded by
Congress and there is no conflict between the federal and state regulations."); Chemerinsky, supra note
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preempt Louisiana community property law, it must do so through "conflict"
preemption.
The federal Copyright Act conflicts with Louisiana community property law
on the issue of initial vesting of copyright. A federal statute impliedly preempts72
any state law with which it conflicts." As discussed more fully below, the
Copyright Act conflicts with Louisiana law for two independent reasons. First,
complying with both federal and state law on the issue of copyright vesting would
be an absolute impossibility. Second, permitting Louisiana law to vest copyrights
in the community patrimonial mass would frustrate important congressional
purposes and objectives of the federal Copyright Act. For these two reasons,
federal copyright law preempts community property law and classifies all
copyrights as the separate property of the author-spouse.
a. Impossibility of Simultaneous Compliance
Federal law impliedly preempts state law when "compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility."'" Put another way, when federal
law and state law are "mutually exclusive," such that "a person could not
simultaneously comply with both," the conflicting provision of state law is
preempted.7" Implied preemption cases presenting instances of physical
impossibility typically are "easy," "obvious," and "rarely giv[e] rise to extended
litigation."'76
It is impossible to give effect to Louisiana Civil Code article 2338 on the one
hand, and the Copyright Clause of the Constitution and the Copyright Act on the
other." Civil Code article 2338 provides that "property acquired during the
52, § 5.2.3, at 296. Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 93 S. Ct. 2303 (973) (no field
preemption under 1909 Copyright Act).
72. Some commentators have quibbled with the use of the term "preemption" in this context.
Particularly, Professor Gardbaum has argued that "[tihe trumping of an otherwise valid state law by
supreme federal law is simply not an instance ofpreemption, but of supremacy." See Gardbaum, supra
note 50, at 809. Irrespective of the terminology employed (the terminology of"supremacy" or the more
traditional rubric of"preemption"), the result is the same: state law must give way to conflicting federal
law. Id. at 784.
73. See, e.g., Gade v. National Solid Waste Mgm't Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S. Ct. 2374,
2383 (1992); see also Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 82 S. Ct.
1210, 1217 (1963); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 132 (1913); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S.
501,533 (1912).
74. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98, 112 S. Ct. at 2383; see also Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142-43,83 S.
Ct. at 1217.
75. Chenerinsky, supra note 52, § 5.2.4, at 297.
76. Antieau &Rich, supra note 51; § 43.19, at 39; Jordan, supra note 59, at 1171 ("Cases where
it is impossible to comply with both federal and state laws are the easy preemption cases which generate
no real controversy.").
77. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.03[A], at 6A-14 ("[W]hile the federal Act
purports to confer an exclusive property right in the author, state community property laws as applied
to copyrights would render author and spouse equal owners of the copyright.").
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existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse"
is community property.7' If given effect, this article would cause all copyrighted
works created during the marriage to form part of the co-owned 9 mass of
community property. In essence, Article 2338 would, if given effect, vest
ownership of all copyrighted works jointly in the author-spouse and the nonauthor
spouse.
It is impossible to give effect both to Civil Code article 2338 and to the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution
provides as follows: "The Congress shall have the Power ... To Promote the
Progress of Science..., by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive
Rights to their respective Writings . .. ." Adopted by the Framers without
debate," the Copyright Clause is one of several provisions constituting Article I,
section 8-the section of the Constitution enumerating Congress' most significant
powers.'2
Louisiana community property law conflicts with the Copyright Clause in a
number of respects. First, the Copyright Clause expressly provides that only
"[a]uthors" can secure "exclusive Rights" in "Writings." However, Louisiana Civil
Code article 2338 attempts to grant property rights in copyrighted works to
nonauthors. Second, the Copyright Clause expressly provides that persons may
obtain exclusive rights only to "their respective Writings ... ."', However, Civil
78. La. Civ. Code art. 2338.
79. La. Civ. Code art. 2336.
80. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
81. SeeNimmer&Nimmer, supranote 14,§ 1.01(A), at 1-4.
82. See Tribe, supra note 53, § 5-2. at 298 ("The chief powers of Congress are listed in Article
1, § 8.").
83. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). Note that the Copyright Act grants exclusive
rights to employers and certain commissioners of works of authorship under the rubric of "works made
for hire." See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)(Supp. 1999); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1999)(defining "work made
for hire"). Such persons are not paradigmatic "authors." Nevertheless, the work-made-for-hire
provision has been held to be constitutional despite that it confers copyright entitlements to
nontraditional "authors." See Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969)
(Friendly, J., dissenting); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 n.5 (2d Cir. 1991) (the conferral of
"'authorship' status on the employer of the creator of a work made for hire ... is not constitutionally
suspect."). Nevertheless, that the work-made-for-hire provision has passed constitutional muster does
not necessarily mean that Civil Code article 2338 would as well. First, these decisions may be wrong.
Second, the work-made-for-hire provision can be distinguished from Article 2338. The work-made-for-
hire provision confers authorship status to a very limited class of persons who generally fit the
traditional definition of "principals" under agency law. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, §
5.03[B][l ][a], at 5-21 ("traditional agency law principles" guide work-made-for-hire analysis). Thus,
it is entirely consistent with longstanding principles of agency law to treat the principals of "true-
author" agents as "authors." In contrast, spouses in Louisiana are, and have never been, agents
(mandataries) for one another. See, e.g., Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 5.2, at 227 (spouses are
"not mandataries or agents of each other"). See generally Patry, supra note 14, at 249 ("Since under
agency principles we may say that the employee is acting for the employer-principal in the employment
context, the fiction of the employer qua author is not too attenuated."). Finally, the work-made-for-hire
provisions were enacted by Congress-not by a state legislature, thus avoiding the constitutional
problems attendant to the State of Louisiana granting copyright entitlements to a nonauthor. See Patry,
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Code article 2338 attempts to grant property rights to persons in works created by
others. Finally, the Copyright Clause specifically gives only "Congress"-not state
legislatures-the power to grant copyright entitlements." However, the Louisiana
legislature, through Article 2338, attempts to grant copyrights to nonauthors. For
these reasons, it is impossible to give effect to both Civil Code article 2338, which
purports to grant a copyright entitlement to nonauthors, and the Copyright Clause
of the Constitution, which requires that copyright entitlements be granted only by
Congress, and then only to authors in works created by them.
It is also impossible to give effect both to Civil Code article 2338 and to
Section 201(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 201(a) provides that
copyright "vests initially in the author or authors" of a work of authorship."5 In
contrast, Civil Code article 2338 attempts to vest copyright in the patrimonial mass
shared by the author-spouse and the nonauthor-spouse. Such a clear conflict
between federal and state law presents an easy preemption analysis. Because the
Copyright Act preempts Civil Code article 2338, Section 20 1(a) of that Act initially
vests copyright solely in the author-spouse. 6
b. Frustration of Congressional Purposes
Federal law impliedly preempts state law not only when state law and federal
law cannot bd applied simultaneously, but also when state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
supra note 14, at 249 (Congress "expressly provided for this fiction [employer as author] in Section
201(b).").
84. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("Congress shall have Power... To Promote the Progress of
Science ... , by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings .... ) (emphasis added); id. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress, which shall consists of a Senate and House of Representatives.") (emphasis added); see
also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (states cannot exercise power
delegated to Congress).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)(Supp. 1999).
86. See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55F. Supp. 2d 534,541 (E.D. La. 1999) ("Ownership cannot vest
simultaneously in both the author alone and in the community."); Nevins, supra note 14, at 399
("community ownership comes into being under state law at the moment the work comes into legal
existence under the Copyright Act and is therefore also 'initial' in nature, thus creating a conflict which
permits of only one resolution under the Supremacy Clause"); Patry, supra note 14, at 272 (community
property's "automatic vesting in the nonauthor spouse is in possible conflict with the Copyright Act's
grant of exclusive rights"); Polacheck, supra note 14, at 604; id. at 607 ("community property law and
federal copyright law... conflict").
Note that under the 1909 Copyright Act, there was no conflict between state community property law
and federal copyright law at the point of initial vesting. Prior to the effective date of the 1976 Copyright
Act, state law protected copyrightable works from the moment of their creation until federal copyright
protection later attached. Thus, at inception these copyrightable works were subject to applicable state
copyright laws and, arguably, state community property laws. See I Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note
14, at § 6AO3[C][1 ], at 6A-1 8--6A-19 ("no federal-state conflict because both common law copyright
and community property [were] creations of state law").
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of Congress. 87  Although a frustration-of-purpose preemption analysis is
unnecessary when, as here, the federal and state laws in issue cannot be applied
simultaneously,"8 such an analysis confirms descriptively that the Copyright Clause
and the Copyright Act in fact preempt community property law with regard to
copyright vesting. Moreover, such an analysis demonstrates normatively why this
should be so. Indeed, to permit state law to classify copyrighted works as
community property not only would undermine the economic market that Congress
created for such works, but also would frustrate Congress' goal to promote greater
uniformity in domestic and international copyright law. In so doing, state
community property law would inflict "major damage" to "clear and substantial"
federal interests. 9
i. Facilitating a Market for Copyrighted Works
The singular goal of copyright is, and constitutionally must be, "[tio Promote
the Progress of Science." 9 Acting pursuant to the power expressly granted to it by
the Copyright Clause, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 to further the
"important public purpose" of promoting the production of new works of
authorship.9 ' To encourage authorship, federal copyright law grants authors
87. Gade v. National Solid Waste Mgm't Assoc., 505 U.S. 88,98, 112 S. Ct. 2374,2383 (1992);
see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52,61 S. Ct. 399 (1941); see also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,91 S. Ct. 1704 (1971). See
generally Antieau & Rich, supra note 51, § 43.19, at 38; Chemerinsky, supra note 52, § 5.2.5, at 300;
Tribe, supra note 53, § 6-26, at 482-83; Jordan, supra note 59, at 1151; Gardbaum, supra note 50, at
808, 810. In evaluating whether the application of a particular state law would frustrate congressional
objectives, courts consider the structure, text and legislative history of the federal statute in question.
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,484, 116 S. CL 2240,2250 (1996); see also Antieau & Rich,
supra note 5 1, § 43.19, at 40-43; Chemerinsky, supra note 52, § 5.2. 1, at 285.
88. See, e~g., Tribe, supra note 53, § 6-26, at 482 n.7 ("[W]hen the governing federal law simply
cannot be read to leave room for a challenged state measure to operate, inquiry into Congress' purposes
cannot properly avoid a conclusion on preemption."); Jordan, supra note 59, at 1157 ("Of course, if the
federal and state laws actually conflict, the Supremacy Clause operates to supersede state law and there
is arguably no need to infer congressional intent to preempt the state law.").
89. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 99 S. Ct. 802, 808 (1979); Rodrigue, 55 F.
Supp. 2d at 538, 541 ("Article 2338 not only literally conflicts with the Act ... it does major damage
to the substantial federal interest in providing exclusive rights to authors.").
90. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (Patent and Copyright Clause). Although somewhat counterintui-
tive, the term "Science" refers to the writings of authors. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
5-6, 86 S. Ct. 684, 687-88 (1966). See generally Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law 63 n.I (4th ed.
1998).
91. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 104 S. Ct. 774, 782
(1984); see Feist Publ'g, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991)
("'he prinmy objective of copyright is not to reward the labors of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.' Art. 1. § 8, cl. 8....'); see also L Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Undberg, The Nature
of Copyright: A Law of Users' Rights 138 (1991) (copyright protection is "granted in return for quid pro
quo-the creation of a work of authorship to benefit the public"); Wendy J. Gordon, Of Hanns and Benefits:
Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. Legal Stud. 449, 449 (1992) ("Legal protection for
intellectual property is based on the benefits the producers generate.").
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exclusive rights in their creations, including the rights to reproduce, adapt,
distribute, publicly perform, and publicly display copyrighted works.' These
property-like rights force would-be users to bargain with authors for permission to
use copyrighted works,93 thus creating an economic market that promotes artistic
creation.94
For any such market to flourish, there must be reasonable certainty regarding
the ownership and transferability of the exclusive rights to be exchanged.95 After
all, potential acquirers presumably pay more money and more often when they are
reasonably certain that a transaction actually will get them what they want.96 The
potential uncertainty surrounding ownership and transferability of works of
authorship threatens the market that Congress has attempted to create through
enacting copyright legislation.' For this reason, when Congress overhauled
American copyright law in the Copyright Act of 1976, it purposely sought to assure.
that the ownership of copyrights remained "clear and definite, so that such property
will be readily marketable." 8 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has noted
that "enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright ownership" was
"Congress' paramount goal" in revising American copyright law in 1976."
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 1999).
93. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in
Intellectual Property Law, 39 Win. &Mary L Rev. 1585,1606 (1998); William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325,328-29 (1989); Stewart E.
Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 1204 (1996).
94. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory,41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343,1389 (1989) ("the copyright
statute... facilitates the use and development of copyrighted works through markets"); Wendy J.
Gordon, On the Economics of Copyright, Restitution, and "Fair Use": Sstemic Versus Case-by-Case
Responses to Market Failure, 8 J. Law & Info. Sci. 7, 11 (1997) (a "private market" for copyrighted
-works generates incentives for production).
95. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.11, at 86 (5th ed. 1998)
("Efficiency requires that property rights be transferable, and if many people have a claim on each piece
of property, transfers will be difficult to arrange."); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of Legal Disputes Over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles, in
Economics of the Arts 177, 183-84 (Victor A. Ginsburgh & Pierre-Michel Menger eds., 1996) (as to
tangible artifacts, "[tihe more secure that property rights in works of art [are], the more likely those
works are to circulate, conferring value on art lovers, scholars, and artists").
96. See Committee for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749, 4 S. Ct. 2166, 2177
(1989) ("In a 'copyright marketplace,' the parties negotiate with an expectation that one of them will
own the copyright in the... work.").
97. This is particularly so given that copyright lacks a mandatory system of recorded titles. See
17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1994) (owner "may obtain registration of the copyright claim"; "registration is not
a condition of copyright protection") (emphasis added); id. § 205(a) (Supp. 1999) ("Any transfer of
copyright ownership or other document pertaining to copyright may be recorded in the Copyright
Office .... ") (emphasis added).
98. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992); see
Konigsberg Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355,357 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J.) (enhancing predictability
and certainty of ownership was 'Congress's paramount goal' when it revised the Act in 1976")
(quoting Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cit. 1990)).
99. See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 749, 109 S. Ct. at 2177.
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To further this "paramount goal," Congress enacted provisions restrictively
delimiting those persons in whom copyrights initially vest. Under Section 201(a)
of the 1976 Act, copyright "vests initially in the author or authors of the work.""o
Congress and the courts have purposely circumscribed the term "author" to include
only those who contribute copyrightable expression to the creation of a work.'0 '
The only exception to this rule is a carefully 'drafted provision relating to works
classified as "works made for hire," that is, works (1) made by employees within
the scope of their employment, or (2) "specially ordered or commissioned" for a
limited number of particularized uses when "the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire." 2 The "author" of a work made for hire is the employer or the commissioner
of the work.0" Thus, Congress and the courts have sharply limited the persons who
can qualify as an "author" in whom copyright can initially vest.
In a similar effort to enhance the predictability of copyright ownership,
Congress in 1976 clarified the manner in which vested copyrights can be
transferred to others. In so doing, Congress strictly limited the acts that can effect
a valid transfer. "° These provisions relating to vesting and transfer have worked
together to resolve much of the confusion regarding copyright ownership that
predated the 1976 Act.'
Allowing state comnunity property law rather than federal copyright law to
prescribe ownership of copyrights would obstruct Congress's goal of facilitating a
100. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (Supp. 1999).
101. See, e.g., CCNV, 490 U.S. at 737,109 S. Ct, at 2171 ("As a general rule, the author is the
party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
expression entitled to copyright protection."); see also Strong, supra note 41, at 38.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1999) (defining "work made for hire"). The particularized'uses are
limited to works ordered for use as "a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas...." Id. Congress' decision
to classify employers and commissioners as "authors" was "hotly contested," and ultimately,
deliberately made. See Patry, supra note 14, at 248-49.
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1996).
104. For example, as to the voluntary transfer of copyrights, Section 204(a) provides that no such
transfer is valid "unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in
writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed...." See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1996). Section
202 provides that the transfer of a "material object... does not of itself convey any rights in the
copyrighted work embodied in the object .... " See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1996). To further enhance
predictability in the context of voluntary transfers, Congress in the 1976 Act provided that certain
certificates of acknowledgment constitute prima facie evidence of the execution of the transfer, and
enacted provisions relating to the recordation of copyright transfers and priority as between conflicting
transfers. See 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1996).
As to the involuntary transfer of copyrights, Section 201(e) provides that, other than in the context
of a bankruptcy proceeding, no involuntary transfer can occur absent a prior voluntary transfer. See 17
U.S.C. § 201(e) (1996).
105. See Leaffer, supra note 40, § 5.11 [A], at 169 (writing requirement "serves as a guidepost to




market for copyrighted works by undermining the predictability of both copyright
vesting and transfer."° As to initial vesting, this threat to predictability seems, at first
blush, exaggerated. After all, if state community property law were to govern copyright
vesting, ownership would simply vest in the patrimonial mass that is co-owned in
indivision by the author- and nonauthor-spouse, and no uncertainty would exist.
Although this may be true with regard to works created entirely during marriage, it
would certainly not be as to works created partly during and partly after termination of
the legal regime. Under federal copyright law, a work is "created" when fixed for the
first time by the author in a tangible medium of expression. " However, when an author
prepares a work "over a period of time," the portion that happens to be fixed at "any
particular time constitutes the work as of that time."'° Applying this principle to a work
in progress upon termination of the legal regime would be problematic. For example,
a single painting by a single author presumably could include some brush strokes co-
owned by the author and his spouse, and some owned solely by the author. 9 Thus, if
state community property law were to govern the initial vesting of copyrights,
uncertainty would exist as to the ownership of works the creation of which straddled the
termination of the legal regime.
As to copyright transfers, permitting state community property law to regulate
copyright conveyances would also create uncertainty regarding ownership. For .
example, if Louisiana law were permitted to-classify copyrights as community
property, it would be unclear whether state law or federal law would govern which
spouse would have the authority to execute valid transfers of community works.
Under federal law, a joint owner acting alone cannot execute a valid copyright
transfer."0 Although state community property laws vary widely on many
management issues,"' Louisiana community property law provides that spouses in
a legal regime share equal authority to alienate most community property. Thus,
106. See Nimmer, supra note 14, at 397 (noting that indeterminancy "threatens chaos for both the
copyright creative and consuming communities").
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996); id. § 101 (Supp. 1999) (defining term "created").
108. Id. § 101 (Supp. 1999).
109. Under the Copyright Act, those in whom copyright vests initially are termed "authors." See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1999); id. § 201 (1996). If, by initially vesting copyright in the co-owned
patrimonial mass, community property law somehow made those portions of a work created during
marriage "joint works," a single painting conceivably could have component copyrights that expire at
different times. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. 1999) (copyright "subsists from its creation and
... endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death") with
id. § 302(b) (Supp. 1999) ("In the case of a joint work... the copyright endures for a term consisting
of the life of the last surviving author and 70 years after such last surviving author's death.").
110. See, e.g., Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.02[B][11, at 6A-10 ("One joint owner
acting alone ... cannot convey an exclusive license in the work. For given that each co-owner owns
an undivided share in the whole, such an exclusive license, if given effect, would effectively deprive
the remaining co-owners oftheir coordinate right to license the work."); Nimmer, supra note 14, at 393;
see also Nayo, supra note 14, at 164-65 ("all joint owners of a copyright must join in a transfer of an
exclusive right").




in sharp contrast to federal copyright law,"' Louisiana law generally permits each
spouse to alienate community property without the consent, and even over the
objection, of the other spouse."'
Furthermore, whether Louisiana community property law would permit a
nonauthor-spouse to alienate copyrights created by the other could depend on the
registration status of the work. Under Louisiana community property law, only the
spouse in whose name a "registered movable" is registered can alienate it."4 If a
registered copyright is a "registered movable,""' then only the registering spouse
could validly transfer the work. The uncertainty associated with these management
issues would give rise to substantial doubt regarding the validity of copyright
transfers executed by Louisiana authors.""
In addition to the adverse market effects resulting from uncertainty, applying
state community property law to copyrights may reduce the incentives created by
copyright law to spur artistic creation. This problem would be most acute in the
wake of divorce. Take for example a divorced author contemplating the creation
of a work based in part on one created during the former marriage."' If he and his
ex-spouse had not partitioned their former community property, then they would
be co-owners of all former-community copyrights and would share all civil fruits
generated through the exploitation of those copyrights.' Because community
112. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, §6A.02[C], at 6A-12 (the "schemata for the
disposition of community assets and of copyrights differ markedly").
113. See La. Civ. Code art. 2346 and cmt. a; see also Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 5.2, at
227-29.
114. See La. Civ. Code art. 2351.
115. Under Louisiana community property law, it would not even be certain whether a registered
copyright would constitute a "registered movable." Professors Spaht and Hargrave have argued that
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2351 and 2347 "should apply only to those movables for which the
registration scheme provided by law is one that purports to protect those who rely on the ownership
inferences that come from registration or issuance in one's name." See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note
26, § 5.7, at 24 1. Copyright's registration scheme provides little protection to those who act in reliance
on any inferences drawn from registration.
116. See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 524, 546 (E.D. La. 1999); Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra note 14, § 6A.02[C], at 6A-13 (indeterminancy regarding transfers "threatens chaos forboth the
copyright creative and consuming communities"); Nimmer, supra note 14, at 392-97; Perlstein, supra
note 14, at 6; Roberts, supra note 14, at 1053.
117. For example, if author Tom Clancy had created the literary character Jack Ryan while subject
to a community property regime, presumably his decision to write additional novels around this
character would be affected by community ownership of the copyright in the character. For an
interesting discussion of the marital property issues raised by Tom Clancy's divorce, see Laura
Lippman, In Tom Clancy's Divorce Case, Wife Seeks Custody of Jack Ryan, The Seattle Times, Jun.
16, 1998, at A10.
118. See La. Civ. Code art. 2369.2 ('Each spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in former
community property and its fruits and products."). Although the ex-spouses would be co-owners of
such former-community copyrights, neither could grant copyright licenses without the concurrence of
the other. Id. art. 2369.4 (Unless the copyright in question were considered a "registered movable"
which was registered in the name of the spouse seeking to grant the copyright licenses. See id. art.
2369.5). The danger of competition between former spouses driving down the value of community
copyrights, and thereby reducing the incentives to create derivative works based thereon, would appear
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property law mandates the sharing of such fruits, the author presumably would be
less inclined to create derivative works based on a former-community copyright
than to create wholly-original works." '9 Moreover, if a former-community
copyright were allotted to the nonauthor upon partition, then the author's creative
decisions would forever be affected. Because the nonauthor would have the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the former community
copyright,' the author could not freely adapt his earlier work. On the contrary,
doing so would render him an infringer of copyright.'2'
This problem is potentially profound. Indeed, it is significantly more
nettlesome than it may at first appear. An author who co-owns a copyright with
another, or who transfers a copyright to another, faces the risk that he may be
forced to share ownership of subsequent works that were not even intended to be
adaptations of the co-owned or transferred work. Consider the copyright
infringement case brought against musician John Fogerty by the record company
to which he had transferred the copyrights in his song Run Through the Jungle.
Fogerty was sued because a song written by him many years later, The Old Man
Down the Road, sounded similar to Run Through the Jungle.'22 Fogerty claimed
that any similarity between the works was attributable to the simple fact that he
wrote both songs. Because both emanated from "the same musical vocabulary,"
argued Fogerty, both had a strikingly similar "'swamp rock' and bluesy sound."'2
While Fogerty ultimately was vindicated at trial,'" the case raises the ominous
issue of "whether composers, writers and artists [can] be barred from creating new
works that bare the stamp of their own distinctive style.... ."'" The same problem
to be minimal. Cf George D. Cary, Study No. 12: Joint Ownership of Copyrights, in I Studies on
Copyright 713 (Copyright Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed. 1963) (1958) (discussing the potential problem of
co-owners competing with one another "with the normal result that both may suffer financially").
119. For example, the prospect of sharing future book revenues with his ex-wife prompted novelist
Tom Clancy to begin "plotting to bump (Jack Ryan) off." Breaking Up is Hard to Do, Dallas Morning
News, Aug. 2, 1998, at 2A.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1996).'
121. As an infringer, the author would potentially be liable to his ex-spouse for actual damages,
statutory damages or all profits attributable to infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. 1999). See
generally Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in Copyright. 48 Emory L.J. I (1999). If liable
for infringer's profits, the author would be permitted to retain any profits attributable to factors other
than the infringed work. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (Supp. 1999). However, the process of apportioning
profits between the infringed work and a myriad of other revenue-generating factors is notoriously
difficult. See Ciolino, supra, at 20-25.
122. See Harvey W. Geller & Thomas M. Hines, Intellectual Property: Copyright Used to
Challenge "Self-Plagiarism ": ShouldDavidLetterman BeRequiredto RevampHls Humor, Nat'l L.J.,
Nov. 1, 1993, at S9; see also Katherine Bishop, A Victoryfor the Creative Process, N.Y. Times, Nov.
11, 1988, at B5.
123. Geller & Hines, supra note 122, at S9.
124. One member of the jury explained the verdict in favor of Mr. Fogerty as follows: "Creative
people have got to have rights to create without being harassed by too many business types." See
Bishop, supra note 122, at B5.
125. Id.; see also Christopher Man, The Scope of Intellectual Property 's Protection of Stylistic
Rights, 47 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 213, 250 (1995) (noting that "most of the artists who have
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would confront a divorced spouse contemplating the creation of a post-divorce
work in a style similar to that reflected in a predivorce work. Such an author's
incentive to create nonderivative yet stylistically similar works would undoubtedly
be diminished. 26
ii. Fostering Uniformity of Copyright Law
In addition to undermining the market that Congress intended to facilitate for
copyrighted works, permitting state community property law to prescribe
ownership of copyrighted works would also frustrate Congress' goal of fostering
greater uniformity in copyright law. When state legislation obstructs Congress'
effort to promote uniformity in an area of federal concern, that legislation is subject
to preemption. 127 In enacting the 1976 Copyright Act, one of Congress' principal
goals was to foster uniformity in national and international copyright law.I This
congressional goal is evident from the structure, text and legislative history 29 of the
Copyright Act and related legislation.
The text of the Copyright Act reflects Congress' concern about fostering
uniformity. Section 301 explicitly preempts state laws that grant rights equivalent
to those within the general scope of copyright.' Moreover, Congress explicitly
vested exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts to adjudicate copyright
disputes.'
sold the copyrights to their works probably never considered the possibility that they could be selling
the backbone of their careers"). As Judge Posner has observed, an artist is:
more likely to duplicate one's own work without copying than another person would be
likely to do. If Cdzanne painted two pictures of Mont St. Victoire, we should expect them
to look more alike than if Matisse had painted the second, even if C&zanne painted the
second painting from life rather than from the first painting.
Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410,414 (7th Cir. 1992).
126. See Man, supra note 125, at 252 (noting that "the inability to distinguish between the public
domain and protected style may reduce the incentive for the public to create"). The only way to
ameliorate this problem would be to allocate to the author-spouse all former-community copyrights
during partition.
127. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,98 S. Ct. 988(1978); see also Tribe, supra
note 53, § 6-26, at 486 (a "conflict with federal objectives may occur when state action undermines a
congressional decision in favor of national uniformity of standards"); Hoke, supra note 50, at 890
(discussing the importance in a preemption analysis ofconsidering "the congressional purpose to create
at the national level a uniform regulatory scheme").
128. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745; see
also Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534, 540 (E.D. La. 1999); Pabry, supra note 14, at 264 (one
of Congress' fundamental purposes underlying the 1976 Act was to "promote national uniformity and
avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforcing an author's rights under the differing laws
and in the separate courts of the various states .... ).
129. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,484, 116 S. Ct. 2240,2250 (1996).
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1996).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1993); see also Sears, Roebuck& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
231 n.7, 84 S. Ct. 784, 788 n.7 (1964) ("The purpose of Congress to have national uniformity in...
copyright laws can be inferred from such statutes as that which vests exclusive jurisdiction to hear...
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The legislative history of the 1976 Act likewise reflects Congress' concern
about uniformity in copyright. That history notes that Congress intended to create
a "single federal system" to "improve the operation of the copyright law," and
thereby to promote "writing and scholarship." '32 This concern for uniformity
transcended domestic concerns. Noting that the "[a]doption of a uniform national
copyright system would greatly improve international dealings in copyrighted
material," the House Report to the 1976 Act presaged the explosion of the internet
and related technologies: "In an era when copyrighted works can be disseminated
instantaneously to every country on the globe, the need for effective international
copyright relations, and the concomitant need for national uniformity, assume ever
greater importance."'
The importance ofuniformity in the law governing initial vesting of copyrights
is likewise clear in the Supreme Court's opinion in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid.'34 In determining whether the copyright at issue in Reid vested
in the person hired to create a sculpture or, rather, in the hiring person, the Court
turned to "the general common law of agency," and forged federal common law in
resolving the issue." 5 Significantly, the Court did not apply the agency law of the
state in which the hiring actually took place. Doing so would have opened the door
to disunity regarding copyright vesting.'
The fact that Congress and the Court have sought to promote national
uniformity in copyright is not surprising in light of the Framers' decision to include
the Copyright Clause as part of the Constitution. That clause, which empowers
Congress to enact legislation securing to authors "the exclusive Right to their...
Writings," '37 exists because the Framers believed that the states could not
"separately make effectual provisions" to protect authors' rights in writings. 3 '
copyright cases in federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) . ); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema
Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1979).
132. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 128, at 5745.
133. Id. at 5746.
134. 490 U.S. 730, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
135. See id. at 751-53, 109 S. Ct. at 2178-80. The Court has used this federal common law
standard regarding employment in noncopyright cases. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318, 322-23, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 1348 (1992).
136. See generally Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 5.03[B][l ][a], at 5-21 n.61 ("Given that
federal statutes are intended to have uniform nationwide application, the Court looked to general
common law, rather than the law of any particular state.").
137. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress ofScience ... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writ-
ings_..").
138. The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison) ("The States cannot separately make effectual
proyisions for [patents.and copyrights], and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point,
by laws passed at the instance of Congress."); see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 128, at 5745(noting that "[o]ne of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the Constitution ... was
to promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforcing an
author's rights under the differing laws and in the separate courts of the various States"); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546,555, 93 S. Ct. 2303,2309 (1973) ("The objective of the Copyright Clause was
clearly to'facilitate the granting of rights national in scope."); Mitchell Bros. v. Film Group, 604 F.2d
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Permitting state community property law to prescribe the ownership of federal
,copyrights would substantially interfere with the uniformity that the Framers,
Congress and the Supreme Court have sought to establish and to maintain in
copyright law in general, and in the vesting of copyright ownership in particular. '39
Among the states and territories, only nine employ a community property system
to govern the ownership, management and post-termination distribution of marital
property. All other jurisdictions utilize some variant of the equitable-distribution
system' 40 Thus, if community property law were permitted to vest ownership in
the spouses jointly rather than in the author-spouse alone, spousal joint vesting
would be the rule in only nine jurisdictions. Moreover, even among these nine
jurisdictions, the laws governing the classification of assets and the management
of community assets are remarkably diverse.' Therefore, applying state
community property law to govern copyright ownership and management could
lead to disunity not only as between American community property jurisdictions
and equitable-distribution jurisdictions, but also within the community property
jurisdictions themselves.
The detrimental effects that would flow from such disunity in the law
governing ownership and transfer of copyrights are perhaps obvious. Rather than
looking to a single federal source to determine whether a would-be transferor in
fact owns and can transfer the copyright sought to be acquired, a prudent potential
transferee, whether from this country or abroad, would have to consider the
following issues: whether the transferor was, or was at some time, married; if so,
whether the transferor was ever domiciled in a community property jurisdiction; if
so, whether the transferor opted out of the default community property regime
through a valid matrimonial agreement; if not, whether the transferor created the
work sought to be acquired during that marriage; and, if so, where the transferor
was domiciled at the time of creation. Only then could the transferee begin his
research into the substantive law of the relevant jurisdiction(s) to determine who
owned and could validly transfer or license the copyrighted work in question.
While these issues would be problematic for a would-be domestic transferee, they
would seem particularly daunting for one living abroad. Given that Congress had
foreign transferees in mind in 1976 when it attempted to adopt "a uniform national
852, 858 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979).
139. See Nimmer, Supra note 14, at 397 (observing that the "Balkanization of copyright transfers
would benefit no one--not the grantees of copyrights, not the author-spouses, and ultimately not even
the non author-spouses").
140. See. e.g., Matthew Bender, supra note 14, § 1.01, at 1-3 (community property jurisdictions
include Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, Texas and
Washington); Mennell & Boykoff, supra note 32, at I.
141. See, e.g., Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 7.2, at
296 (2d ed. 1988) (observing that there are "many variations among the eight states" that have adopted
community property); Matthew Bender, supra note 14, § 20.02[ 1], at 20-17 ("the marital property laws
of the eight community property states, although based on common principles, vary significantly"); see
also Mennell & Boykoff, supra note 32, at I; Nimmer, supra note 14, at 388.
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copyright system" to "improve international dealings in copyrighted material,""'
such disunity would obstruct the congressional purpose of creating a uniform,
"single Federal system" of copyright law,"" in addition to undermining the
substantially related goal of enhancing predictability of ownership.'"
For all of these reasons, federal law impliedly preempts Louisiana community
property law on the issue of initial vesting of copyright. Indeed, giving effect to
Louisiana community property law not only would render it impossible to comply
with the Copyright Clause of the Constitution and the vesting provisions of the
Copyright Act, but also would frustrate important objectives underlying the
Clause and the Act. Considering these compelling circumstances, the
preemption of community property law by federal law does not offend
federalism principles. Indeed, because the copyright entitlement is neither a
natural right nor a creature of state law, but rather, a purely federal entitlement that
exists solely as a result of federal positive law,"' foreclosing states from regulating
initial ownership of a federal entitlement poses no meaningful threat to state
sovereignty.
III. FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, AND INTERSPOUSAL TRANSFERS OF COPYRIGHT
OWNERSHIP SUBSEQUENT TO VESTING
Although federal copyright law vests initial ownership of a work solely in the
author of the work, a nonauthor-spouse could nonetheless become a co-owner
through a subsequent transfer ofcopyright ownership. Under federal copyright law,
such an interspousal transfer could occur voluntarily or, perhaps, involuntarily. "6
After briefly addressing the manner in which an author-spouse can voluntarily
transfer co-ownership of a copyright to his spouse, this Part considers whether
Louisiana community property law effects an involuntary interspousal transfer of
copyright co-ownership.
142. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 128, at 5746.
143. Id. at 5745
144. See supra Part ll.C.2.b.(1); Roberts, supra note 14, at 1059 ("Having a single national
standard gives all authors the same rights and protections, and allows copyrighted works to be
exchanged efficiently."); see also Patry, supra note 14, at 265 ("it would greatly avoid the practical
difficulties of determining and enforcing an author's or his assignee's rights if the community property
laws were preempted and the author deemed to posses wholly all copyright interests in his or her
work").
145. See Nimmer & Nimnner, supra note 14, § 1.04, at 1-66.12 (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
(8 Peters) 591 (1834)); Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 91, at 110 (stating that in 1976 Copyright Act,
Congress "clearly selected a single theory on which to build the new law: the statutory-grant theory");
Pierre N. Leval, Commentary: Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L Rev. 1105,1108 (1990)
(copyright exclusive rights are not "absolute or moral right[s], inherent in natural law," but rather "exist
only by virtue of statutory enactment").
146. See. e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1996). See generally Nevinssupra note 14, at 392 ("[tlransfers




The most obvious and least controversial way in which a nonauthor-spouse
could become a co-owner of a copyright is through a voluntary transfer of such an
interest from her author-spouse. Section 201 (d)(1) of the Copyright Act provides,
"[t]he ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any
means of conveyance .. .""' Any such transfer, whether between spouses or
other persons, can be effected only through a signed writing: a voluntary transfer
"is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the
transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such
owner's duly authorized agent."'4 8 Congress imposed this signed-writing
requirement on voluntary transfers to enhance the predictability of copyright
ownership, to increase the marketability of copyrights, and to ensure that copyright
owners are not inadvertently divested of rights in their works."' To further these
goals, courts typically construe ambiguities in transfer instruments in favor of
transferors.5
Although the federal Copyright Act permits an author to transfer co-ownership
of a copyright to his spouse through a signed-writing, Louisiana community
property law presents a potential problem in this regard. In Louisiana, a spouse can
donate separate property to the community only through an "authentic act."''
Thus, although federal law provides that any copyright interest is transferrable to
any person through a signed writing, Louisiana law provides that separate property
can be transferred to the community only through an authentic act. Given this
conflict, Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act' should preempt the authentic-act
requirement of the Louisiana Civil Code and thus set forth the exclusive means by
147. 17 U.S.C. § 201(dXl) (1996). The term "transfer of copyright ownership" includes "an
assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a
copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time
or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license." See Id. § 101 (Supp. 1999) (defining
"transfeir of copyright ownership").
148. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1996).
149. See, e.g., Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp.. 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the signed-writing requirement was "designed to protect people against false claims of oral
agreements" and "to make the ownership of property rights in intellectual property clear and definite,
so that such property will be readily marketable").
150. See, e.g., Philipp v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 145 F. Supp. 756,758 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) ("The
clearest language is necessary to divest the author of the fruits of his labor."). See generally Goldstein,
supra note 14, § 4.6.1.1, at 4:85-4:87 ("The nascent federal common law of copyright contract
interpretation ... favor[s] authors over their transferees."); Leafier, supra note 40, § 5.11 [A], at 169;
3 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 10.03[A][3], at 10-39; Patty, supra note 40, at 388; Id. at 392.
151. La. Civ. Code art. 2343.1 ("As to both movables and immovables, a transfer by... gratuitous
title must be made by authentic act."). In so doing, "the transferor conveys to the other spouse one-half
of what he owns and retains the other half as co-owner under the regime ofacquets and gains." See Id.
art. 2343.1, cmt. b. Presumably, if the author-spouse sought gratuitously to transfer an undivided one-
half interest in a copyright to his spouses' separate patrimony, then community property law would
impose no special form requirements.
152. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1996).
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which all owners, whether married or not, can effect voluntary copyright
transfers. " This exclusive means-a transfer in an unambiguous writing signed
by the author-spouse-should, as Congress intended, present few problems.
B. Involuntary Transfers by Operation of Law
In contrast to the straightforward nature of voluntary copyright transfers, the
issues presented by involuntary copyright transfers are more complicated. Section
201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act, which explicitly permits involuntary transfers,
appears simple enough: "[t]he ownership of a copyright may be transferred in
whole or in part... by operation of law."'' Although the legislative history and
case law relating to involuntary transfers are sparse,'" Congress apparently enacted
Section 201(d)(l) to permit seizures in the context of "[t]raditional legal actions
that may involve transfer of ownership, such as bankruptcy proceedings and
mortgage foreclosures.""
The argument that Section 201(d)(1) and state community property law
combine to effect a copyright "transfer by operation of law" goes as follows: even
if copyrights vest solely in the author-spouse by preemptive operation of federal
copyright law, copyright ownership is subsequently transferred to the community
by operation of state community property law. For the reasons discussed below,
this argument is fundamentally flawed not only as a matter of Louisiana community
property law, but also as matter of federal copyright law.
1. Interspousal Copyright Transfers by Operation of Community
Property Law?
As a threshold matter, in order for Section 201 (d)(1) of the Copyright Act to
permit an interspousal transfer "by operation of law," some operative provision of
state law must purport to effect a transfer. However, neither legislation, nor case
law, nor any other principle of Louisiana community property law operates to
transfer any portion of one spouse's separate property to the community.
Louisiana generally classifies assets as either community property or separate
property at the time of acquisition. 7 Once the law classifies an asset as a spouse's
"separate property," it remains that spouse's separate property until he transfers it
153. See supra Part II.C.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 201(dX1)(1996).
155. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 128, at 5738-39; Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp. 202,
205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Case law on transfer of copyright by operation of law is sparse.").
156. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 128, at 5739.
157. See. e.g., Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 2.1, at 23 ("ln classifying an asset the issue
normally is whether it is community or separate and the focus is usually on the time ofacquisition and
the natureofthe transaction by which the asset is acquired."); see also Matthew Bender, supra note 14,
§ 20.03[2), at 20-57 (noting that Louisiana generally follows the "vesting-of-right theory" in classifying
property at the time of acquisition); de Funiak & Vaughn, supra note 24, § 106, at 264.
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through a voluntary juridical act ' to the community or to another person.' 9 As
discussed previously, any such voluntary transfer to the community must be executed
in accordance with certain statutory formalities."W In short, separate property remains
separate property. Any contrary rule causing the automatic transmutation of separate
property to community property would be a radical departure from Louisiana's
community property system'' Indeed, to tolerate the automatic conversion of separate
property into community property would be to disregard the respect long paid to the
separate estates of husband and wife by Louisiana's gananical system of community
property law and the Spanish system from which it originated. 62
Given that federal copyright law vests all copyrights solely in the author-spouse
rather than in the spouses jointly, 63 copyrighted works created during marriage are the
separate property of the author-spouse. As separate property, such copyrights remain
separate unless transformed into community property. Because no provision of
Louisiana law operates to transiute involuntarily an author-spouse's separate copyrights
into both spouses' community property, the possibility that Section 201(d)(1) of the
Copyright Act might have permitted such a transfer "by operation of law" is a matter of
only hypothetical interest. 1
158. "A juridical act is any manifestation of the will meant to have legal effects." See Alain A.
Levasseur, Louisiana Law of Obligations in General 6 (3d ed. 1996).
159. As summarized by Professors Spaht and Hargrave:
It is of course possible, through sales, donations or other transmutation agreements, to
convert separate property into community assets, but this transformation does not occur by
operation of law.
Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.46, at 175 (emphasis added); see also Matthew Bender, supra
note 14, § 3.03[5), at 3-37 to 3-38 ("transmutation occurs through an exercise of actual intention,
objectively expressed," not by operation of law).
160. See supra Part III.A.
161. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.49, at 186 (stating that a rule allowing
"transmutations of separate assets could lead to an increasing departure from the community system").
162. See. e.g., Ballinger, supra note 24, at 4 (community property system "regards the husband
and wife as distinct persons, with separate rights and capable of holding distinct and separate estates").
In contrast to a gananical system, the French community property system originally provided for the
automatic conversion of separate movable property into community property upon marriage. See. e-g.,
3 Planiol & Ripert, supra note 24, pt. 1, ch. I, no. 915, at 94 ("In principle, and except for several items
noted later, all the personalty of the spouses enters the community. This includes all the present
personalty, that is personalty the spouses own on the day of marriage; and all the personalty to be
acquired afterwards."); id. no. 918, at 98 ("It is quite rare to find personalty in separate ownership of
either spouse, living in a community."); see also Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.46, at 175
("Louisiana never adopted the French community of movables and acquets under which the movables
owned by both spouses at the time of marriage became community property."). Interestingly, one type
of property that never became community property under the French system was intellectual property,
particularly copyrights. See 3 Planiol & Ripert, supra note 24, pt. 1, ch. I, no. 917, at 97 ("The rights
of author are simply a monopoly of exploitation. As such they are merely part of the exercise of his
profession. Hence, they should remain in separate ownership."). France ultimately adopted a gananical
system of community property (of acquets and gains) in 1965. See Mennell & Boykoff, supra note 32,
at II.
163. See supra Part II.
164. Bycontrast, in an equitable-distribution jurisdiction, any "transfer by operation of law" would
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2. Federal Limitations on Copyright Transfers by Operation of State Law
Even if Louisiana community property law actually purported to transfer one
spouse's separate copyright to the community, a substantial federal obstacle to such
transfers would still remain. Although Section 201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act
explicitly permits transfers "by operation of law," a related provision-Section
201(e)-sharply limits which copyrights can be so transferred. 5 Section 201(e)
provides that no "action by any governmental body or other official or organization
purporting to ... transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the
copyright ... shall be given effect" if the copyright "has not previously been
transferred voluntarily by that individual author.... "" Read together, Sections
20 l(d)(1) and 201 (e) combine to permit the involuntary transfer of a copyright only
after a prior voluntary transfer.'67
a. Generally
Applied to community property law, Sections 201(d)(1) and 201(e) would
permit states to effect a transfer "by operation of law" of only those copyrights that
have "previously been transferred voluntarily" by the author-spouse. The universe
of copyrights eligible for transfer by operation of community property law is
limited. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how any copyrights, other than those
that vest in an employer-spouse as works made for hire,' 5 would be eligible for
take place at or after divorce. Thus, if a court were to attempt to allocate a copyright to a nonauthor-
spouse in the context of a distribution of marital property, then a "transfer by operation of law"
presumably could occur at that time. See generally Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property
§ 2.07, at 40 (2d ed. 1994). Of course, significant obstacles to such a transfer by operation of equitable-
distribution law would remain, including Section 201 (e) of the Copyright Act and federal preemption
doctrine.
165. See Patry, supra note 40, at 388 n. 16 ("Section 20 1 (e) contains an exception to the transfer
by operation of law provision of § 201 (dXI).").
166. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1996) ("Involuntary transfer. When an individual author's ownership
of a copyright ... has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action
by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer,
or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright... shall be given effect under this title,
except as provided under title 11."). Title I I relates to bankruptcy proceedings. See II U.S.C. §§ I -
1330 (1984).
167. See I Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.03[C][2][b], at 6A-23 ("by operation of law"
provision applicable only if there has been no prior voluntary transfer); Nevins, supra note 14, at 392
("How is (Section 201(d)(1)'s 'by operation of law' provision] to be squared with Section 201(e)?
Obviously by reading Subsection (e)'s voluntariness requirement into Subsection (d)(1), or in other
words, by requiring that the transfer, whether by the author or by operation of law, be grounded in the
author's consent in one form or another.").
168. Because Section 201(e) refers to "individual" authors, it presumably does not apply to
involuntary transfers of works made for hire. See Goldstein, supra note 14, § 4.4.4.1, at 4:58 ("By
limiting section 201(e) to transfers from 'individual' authors, Congress presumably intended to exclude
works made for hire from the provision's operation."). Thus, any copyrights that vested in a spouse
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such a transfer in a community property jurisdiction that classifies at acquisition.
This is so because at the very moment of creation, copyrights vest solely in the
author-spouse and are his "separate property" as of that moment. 69 Therefore, any
voluntary transfer by the author-spouse that could potentially satisfy the previous-
transfer requirement of Section 201(e) would necessarily occur at some time after
the copyright vested in his separate patrimony.
Considering this, to harmonize community property law with Sections
201(d)(1) and 201(e), the Louisiana legislature would have to legislate (quite
artfully) that separate copyrights are transmuted "by operation of law" into
community copyrights at some point following a voluntary transfer by the author-
spouse. Alternatively, the legislature could permit courts either to partition
separate copyrights or to order that some sort of equalizing payment be made by the
author-spouse to the nonauthor-spouse at partition. Either provision would be a
most curious addition to Louisiana community property law.' For these reasons,
it appears that Section 201(e) effectively prohibits involuntary transfers by
operation of state community property law.
b. The Counterarguments
Courts and commentators have posited a number of counterargunents which,
if valid, might remove the substantial federal obstacle to community copyright
ownership presented by Section 201(e). Although some of these arguments are less
frivolous than others, all are unpersuasive.
i. Legislative History
Some have relied upon the sparse legislative history of Section 201 (e) to argue
that Congress did not intend to apply that provision to domestic copyright transfers
or to marital-property transfers.' Granted, in enacting Section 201(e), Congress
was primarily concerned about protecting foreign dissidents from the seizure of
solely because he was the employer of a paradigmatic "author," would be eligible for transfer to the
community (if state law so provided) irrespective of whether the employer-spouse had ever before
voluntarily transferred them.
169. See supra Part II.B.
170. In addition, any such provision would likely be preempted by federal copyright law,
notwithstanding that it otherwise complied with Section 201(e). See supra Part ll.B.
171. See Goldstein, supra note 14, § 4.4.4.2, at 4:60 ("a state's allocation ofentitlements between
husband and wife falls outside of the censorship concerns that motivated section 201(e)'s adoption");
Nayo, supra note 14, at 176 ("Section 201(e) clearly targets the evil of the government retaining the
copyright interest, without mentioning whether the copyright attaches to a work authored during
marriage."); Patry, supra note 14, at 247 (arguably,"Congress was aware of the vesting of equal rights
in community property states, and by its silence allowed an implied assignment of a one-half interest
to the non-author spouse by operation of the community property laws."). Cf Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign 's Prerogative, 67 Tex. L Rev. 685, 711
(1989) (arguing from the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act that Section 201(e) should not
prevent states from expropriating federal copyrights).
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their American copyrights by disapproving totalitarian governments.' And
granted, the legislative history of the 1976 Act is completely devoid of any
indication that Congress intended for Section 201(e) to prevent involuntary
interspousal copyright transfers.73 Nevertheless, neither the legislative history nor
the plain language of Section 20 1(e) supports these arguments.
First, the legislative history 74 of Section 201(e) offers contrary indications
suggesting that Congress actually intended for that section to apply to all copyright
transfers, not just to those in the context of foreign censorship. For example, a
precursor to Section 201 (e) provided that copyright would "remain the property of
the author.., regardless of any law, decree or other act of a foreign state or nation
which purports to divest the author ... of the United States copyright in his
work."'" However, Congress deleted this limiting language when it enacted
Section 201(e) into law.'7  That Congress' deletion was not inadvertent'7 is
172. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 128, at 5739 ('[S]ubsection (e) would protect
foreign authors against laws and decrees purporting to divest them of their rights under the United
States copyright statute, and would protect authors within the foreign country who choose to resist such
covert pressures."); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 10.04, at 10-53; Paul Goldstein, Preempted
State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24
U.C.L.A. L Rev. 1107, 1109 (1977) ("Behind section 201 (e) is the fear that the Soviet Union will use
the copyright law to suppress the publication of dissident Soviet works in the United States."); id. at
1127 ("Some courts may read the legislative history closely and confine the section's operation to the
occasion that motivated it-fears over Soviet suppression of dissident works."); Kwall, supra note 171,
at 695-96; Martin & Smith, supra note 70, at 92 ("prohibition contained in section 201(e) was intended
to restrict foreign abuses of copyright protections"); Nayo, supra note 14, at 176; Nevins, supra note
14, at 382-83 ("The primary and originally the sole intended target of [201(e)] is the expropriation of
copyright interests by a foreign government.").
Despite Congress' desire to protect foreign dissidents from censorship through enacting Section
20 1(e), that provision was probably unnecessary. Not only had the Soviet Union never attempted such
censorship, but the Universal Copyright Convention would not have required American courts to
recognize the validity of such a seizure. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 10.04, at 10-53.
Moreover, given that copyright law protects only expression and not ideas, the Soviet Union could never
have suppressed the dissemination of unpopular ideas merely through copyright seizure. See Goldstein,
supra, at 1124.
173. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 128; see also Nevins, supra note 14, at 382 ("the
members of Congress who worked on [the Copyright Act of 1976] seem not to have known that they
were forging a link between copyright and divorce"); id. at 386 (Congress did not consider transfers in
which "the court forcibly transfers some of an author's copyright interests to his or her ex-spouse");
Patry, supra note 14, at 247 ("Neither the Act nor the Committee Reports address the issue of a joint
authorship status for nonauthor spouses in community property states.").
174. Note that the "value of legislative history as a tool of statutory construction is not universally
accepted." Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and the Legislative
Process 29 (1997); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92, 108 S. Ct. 513,522 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (legislative materials are "frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of
a law and its presentment to the President");' Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 Duke L.J. 371,375.
175. S. 1359,93d Cong., I stSess. 1, 1-2 (1973) (emphasis added) (discussed in Kwall, supra note
17 1. at 695-96).
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1996). See generally Kwall, supra note 171, at 695-96.
177. Further confirming that Congress has always understood that Section 201(e) applies to
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confirmed by the House Report to the 1976 Act, which describes the purpose of
Section 20 1(e) as follows: "The purpose of this subsection is to reaffi-m the basic
principle that the United States copyright of an individual author shall be secured
to that author, and cannot be taken away by any involuntary transfer."'7s This
legislative purpose confirms that Section 201(e), rather than being an anomaly,
actually embodies a deep-seated principle of American copyright law' 9--the
notion that authorship is special and that, as a result, authors have a special interest
in their creations.' ° Thus, the legislative history of the Copyright Act simply does
domestic involuntary transfers is that Congress amended Section 201(e) just two years later to qualify
its anti-alienation language as follows: "except as provided under title I ." See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e)
(1996) (as amended by Pub. L 95-598). This amendment specifically authorized involuntary copyright
transfers in the context of bankruptcy proceedings. If Congress had believed that Section 201(e) did
not already apply to domestic transfers, this amendment obviously would have been unnecessary. See
Martin & Smith, supra note 70, at 95 ("The fact that Congress found it necessary to carve out a specific
exception to the general prohibition on involuntary transfers for involuntary bankruptcy proceedings
serves to underscore how narrowly the exceptions to this prohibition should be construed."); Nimmer,
supra note 14, at 408; Nevins, supra note 14, at 383 ("[T]he six final words of the provision, added
after the effective dateof the Copyright Revision Act and excluding bankruptcy proceedings under Title
I I from the scope of the rule, confirm the view that all other domestic copyright expropriations are
subject to Section 201(e).").
178. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 128, at 5739 (emphasis added).
179. Some provisions of the Copyright Act reflect Congress' concern for protecting artists'
personal interests in their creations. For example, the distribution right protects a right similar to the
moral right of divulgation. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1996); 2 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, §
8D.02[C] ("[T]he author's right to control publication of his work can be seen as a species of the drolt
de divulgation."). Likewise, the Act's termination-of-transfers provision gives an artist a continuing
interest in his work of authorship even after transferring the copyright to another. See 17 U.S.C. § 203
(1996). Finally, Section 106A gives authors certain limited rights in their works of visual art even after
they have transferred the copyrights embodied in such works. See id. § 106(a) (1996); id. § 101 (1996)
(defining "work of visual art").
180. See Roberts, supra note 14, at 1065 ("there is something special about authorship that
demands we give creators ultimate control over the marketing and disposition of their works [at least
until voluntary transfer]"); see also Joyce et al., supra note 90, § 1.04, at 27-28; Alfred C. Yen,
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 517, 537 n.136
(1990) (Section 201(e) seems "grounded in natural law, and not economics"). Perhaps this view springs
from the civil law notion that an author's work is "an extension of his or her personality." See, e.g.,
Leaffer, supra note 40, § 1.1, at 3 ("In the civil law world, an author is deemed to have a moral
entitlement to control and exploit the product of his or her intellect.").
Nevertheless, because the special relationship between an author and his work can diminish over
time, Section 201(e) adjusts the author's entitlement accordingly. Professor Margaret Jane Radin has
persuasively argued that some types of property warrant greater protection than do other types. See
Margaret J. Radin, Rethinking Property (1993) (reprinting Margaret J. Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 Stan. L Rev. 957 (1982)). Namely, Professor Radin argues that "personal property"
has a stronger moral claim to protection than does "fungible" property. Id. at 48. Where on the
personal-fungible spectrum a particular thing falls can change over time as the holder's relationship
with the object changes, or as the object is transferred from person to person. Id. at 16-17, 54.
Arguably, Section 201(e) reflects the notion that once an author has transferred his copyright in a work,
the transferred work has, at least in the author's eyes, moved a bit closer toward the fungible end of this
spectrum. Once the copyrighted work becomes more fungible than personal, the author's interest in
preventing involuntary transfers diminishes.
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not support the argument that Congress enacted Section 201(e) to prevent only
involuntary foreign transfers.
Second, the plain language of Section 201(e) unambiguously provides that "no
action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to....
transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright ... shall be
given effect" absent a prior voluntary transfer.'' When the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the plain-meaning rule"82 ofstatutory interpretation dictates
that any further search for legislative intent is inappropriate. Section 20 1(e) is clear
and unambiguous. It applies to "any governmental body," foreign, state or federal,
and forbids any action by such a body purporting to "seize, expropriate, transfer or
exercise rights" of copyright ownership. ' Therefore, Section 20 1(e) applies to any
purported interspousal copyright transfer by operation of state community property
law or by any judge acting pursuant to such law. 'U A contrary purposivist
interpretation of Section 201 (e) would run afoul of the fundamental "constitutional
truism that the judicial will must bend to the legislative command."'83
ii. Consent
Other proponents of state community property law, arguing within the four
comers of Section 20,1(e), have suggested that Section 201(e) is not an obstacle to
interspousal transfers because author-spouses residing in-community property
jurisdictions have impliedly consented to such transfers.' 6 The argument goes as
181. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e)(1996) (emphasis added).
182. See Texas Food Indus. Assoc. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 81 F.3d 578, 581 (5th
Cir. 1996) (stating plain-meaning rule); United States v. Meeks, 69 F.3d 742, 744 (5th Cir. 1995)
(noting that legislative body presumably "says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what
it says").
183. Even ifCongress did not intend this, it is nevertheless the law. SeeGoldstein, supra note 172,
at 1124 ("What began as a bit of misplaced xenophobia has evolved into a bizarre rule of nullifica-
tion."). That Section 201(e) may have had unintended consequences is perhaps not unusual. See, e.g.,
Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How
We Think About Marriage, 40 Win. & Mary L Rev. 145,158 (1998) ("Legal change is rarely simple,
and unintended consequences are probably the rule rather than the exception.").
184. See Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534,542 (E.D. La. 1999); 3 Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra note 14, §10.04, at 10-53 (Section 201(e) is "not limited to [seizures and transfers] by foreign
governments, officials and organizations"); Goldstein, supra note 172, at 1124 (Section 201(e)
"invalidat[es] domestic as well as foreign involuntary transfers"); Nevins, supra note 14, at 383 ("the
plain meaning of the section's language is that it... applies to copyright expropriations by the federal
government itself orby any of the states"); id. ("Since January 1, 1978, state courts have been precluded
from involuntarily awarding any share of a married author's copyrights to his or her non-author spouse
as matrimonial property in a divorce action."); see also Robert A. Kreiss, Ten Theories For Hiring
Parties Who Want to Own Works Created or Invented by Independent Contractors, 5 Computer L.
Wkly. 10 (1991); Martin & Smith, supra note 70, at 92.
185. Mikva & Lane, supra note 174, at 4; Id. at 9 ("judicial avoidance of a clear legislative
command, whether based on a judicial view of legislative intent or on a judicial policy preference, is
a unique exercise of judicial power").
186. See Nimmer, supra note 14, at 414 ("by virtue of Section 201(e), community property may
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follows: Section 201(e) permits copyright transfers by operation of law if the
individual author has previously transferred his copyright in a voluntary
transaction; an individual author's consent to a future copyright transfer is itself a
"voluntary transfer" within the meaning of the Section 201(e); an author-spouse
impliedly consents to future interspousal copyright transfers by not opting out of
the legal regime; ergo, Section 201(e) permits interspousal transfers by operation
of state community property law."s This argument is hopelessly flawed for a
number of independent reasons.
First, an author's mere consent to a future copyright transfer is not a
"voluntary transfer" within the meaning of Sections 201(e) and 101 of the
Copyright Act. Section 201(e) prohibits involuntary transfers when "ownership"
of the copyright "has not previously been transferred voluntarily.""' The term
"transfer of copyright ownership" is a term of art that Congress has specifically
defined in Section 101 to include, "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or
other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright.. . ." 9 These listed
juridical acts give rise to present conveyances of real rights in a copyrighted
work.'" They do not give rise to the mere expectation that such a right will be
conveyed in the future. To equate an author's consent to a future transfer with a
true "transfer," would disregard the plain language of Section 101 of the Copyright
Act. For this reason alone, a spouse's consent to a future copyright transfer can not
satisfy the prior-transfer requirement of Section 201(e).
Second, even if an author's consent to a future copyright transfer could
constitute a "transfer," that consent cannot be "implied." The Copyright Act
exist in the copyright sphere only through finding the author-spouse's consent to sharing author
status").
187. See, e.g., 2 Matthew Bender, supra note 14, § 23.07[31[b], at 23-146 ("consent can be
inferred by the very act of marriage, at least in cases where the parties do not 'opt out' of the state
classification system"); Goldstein, supra note 14, § 4.4.4.2, at 4:60-4:61 ("marriage" and "dissolution"
of marriage "imply mutual consent to at least the same extent as mortgage foreclosures and bankruptcy
filings"); Kreiss, supra note 184, at 16 ("residence in a community property state constitutes voluntary
consent to transfers to one's spouse under community property rules"); Nimmer, supra note 14, at 409
("one can plausibly maintain that such 'consent' automatically accompanies the decision to marry");
Patry, supra note 14, at 272 ("a court faced with a preemption challenge would be well advised to find
an implied voluntary transfer under the traditional operations of law permitted under Section 201 (e)");
Perlstein, supra note 14, at 5; Polacheck, supra note 14, at 625 ("Admittedly, the decision to marry in
California arguably establishes consent to California community property law and its effects on the
ownership, management and division of copyright."), Wong, supra note 14, at 1101 ("section 201(e)
does not prohibit transfers by operation of law where the author's consent is implied by overt acts");
Roberts, supra note 14, at 1072 n.62 ("201 (e) essentially prohibits transfers by operation of law where
... consent cannot be implied"). Cf. Nayo, supra note 14, at 177 (parties have "consented to the
application of community property law by pursuing dissolution of their marriage, and division of their
accumulated property").
188. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1996) (emphasis added).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 10l (1996) (defining"transfer ofcopyright ownership").
190. For example, the Louisiana Civil Code provides that "[m]ortgage is an indivisible real right
that burdens the entirety of the mortgaged property and that follows the property into whatever hands
the property may pass." La. Civ. Code art. 3280 (emphasis added).
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strictly forbids implied copyright transfers. Section 204(a) provides that no
voluntary copyright transfer is "valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note
or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent." Furthermore, Section 202
provides that a transfer of copyright is not implied from the transfer of a material
object embodying the work.'9 ' And Section 106A provides that an artist's waiver
of rights in a tangible work of visual art "shall not constitute a transfer of
ownership" of copyright "[e]xcept as may otherwise be agreed by the author in a
written instrument signed by the author." 92 Considering these straightforward
provisions-all of which confirm the absolute necessity of a signed instrument to
effect a copyright transfer-it is most difficult to understand how an "implied"
voluntary transfer could ever be valid. In fact, Congress intended to prevent, and
has effectively foreclosed, any implied copyright transfers. 93 Therefore, although
some are mistaken on this issue,'" there is simply no such thing as an "implied"
copyright transfer. 9 '
Third, even if an author's consent to a future copyright transfer could
constitute a present voluntary "transfer," and even if the Copyright Act recognized
"implied" transfers, consent to a future transfer cannot be implied from the mere
fact that the author-spouse is a married person domiciled in Louisiana who did not
opt out of the legal regime." The Louisiana Civil Code distinguishes between
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1996).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2) (1996).
193. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 128, at 5738-40" Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908
F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Copyright law dovetails nicely with common sense by requiring that
a transfer of copyright ownership be in writing. Section 204 ensures that the creator of a work will not
give away his copyright inadvertently and forces a party who wants to use the copyrighted work to
negotiate with the creator to determine precisely what rights are being transferred and at what price.").
194. See Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp. 202, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("transfers of copyrights by
operation of law are limited in number, and depend upon circumstances which establish the author's
express or implied consent") (emphasis added); Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6A.03[C][2][b],
at 6A-24 ("the application of community property laws to copyrighted works stands or falls based on
whether married authors have at least implicitly consented to transfers of their works"); id. § 10.04, at
10-54; Nimmer, supra note 14, at 408 ("Section 201 (e) requires at least implied consent of the author");
see also supra note 187.
195. Indeed, recognizing the viability of such an implied transfer would be a precarious step onto
a slippery slope that could lead to implied transfers under other state laws-something Congress clearly
did not intend. For example, it could lead the partners of an author to claim co-ownership of works
created during the existence of their partnership. To date, courts have not been willing to imply
transfers under state partnership law. See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 10.03[A][61, at 10-43
("[Ijt is unavailing to argue that an author orally agreed to transfer her copyright interest to a
partnership. That latter circumstance would require a signed instrument, an author of course can validly
contribute his work to a partnership."); see also Koningsberg Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357-58
(9th Cir. 1994); Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984). It is difficult to understand why courts
would or should recognize implied transfers under state community property law, particularly when the
marital community is often analogized to a partnership.
196. See Nevins, supra note 14, at 392 ("an author's marriageperse cannot be held to constitute
implied consent to judicial division of his or her copyright interests upon divorce without doing
violence to the pro-author policies of the Copyright Act").
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obligations arising from "declarations of will," and those arising "from the law,
regardless of a declaration of will.' 97  In sharp contrast to conventional
obligations, which arise from the "consent" of the parties,"" the rights and
obligations created by Louisiana community property law' do not arise from a
"declaration of will." Rather, they arise from nothing more than one's status as a
married person domiciled in the State of Louisiana."° For this reason, the
obligations created by community property law are among those that the Civil Code
denotes as arising "from the law, regardless of a declaration of will." '' Given the
nonconsensual source of such obligations, it is difficult to understand how merely
being a spouse subject to the legal regime can, in and of itself, constitute "implied
consent" to future interspousal copyright transfers. Two rejoinders, however, come
to mind.
197. La. Civ. Code art. 1757. See generally Levasseur, supra note 158, at 4 ("The law... may
impose obligations regardless of any declaration of will or fact on the part of an obligor." Such
obligations "are created by law on the basis of a particular juridical situation.").
198. See La. Civ. Code art. 1927 ("A contract is formed by the consent of the parties established
through offer and acceptance.").
199. The legal regime of community property gives rise to both real and personal rights and real
and personal obligations. For example, spouses in a legal regime have a real right in all things acquired
by the other spouse during the existence of the legal regime through that spouse's effort, skill or
industry. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2336 (ownership of community property); id. art. 2338 (community
property). The source of the real right and corresponding real obligation is community property law.
Likewise, spouses formerly in a legal regime may have a personal right against the other spouse for
certain reimbursements. Id. art. 2358. The source of this personal right and corresponding personal
obligation is community property law. For a discussion of the differences between real rights/obliga-
tions and personal rights/obligations, see I Safil Litvinoff, Obligations § 1.5, at 9-11 in 5 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1992); Levasseur, supra note 158, at 26-28.
200. See La. Civ. Code art. 2334 ("The legal regime of community of acquets and gains applies
to spouses domiciled in this state, regardless of their domicile at the time of marriage or the place of
celebration of the marriage."). See generally Litvinoff, supra note 199, § 1.2, at 4 (various obligations
between spouses are "called institutional, because the parties are immersed in an institution which, in
this context, is to be understood as a situation existing between persons, or between persons and things,
regulated by the law according to ideas and patterns of behavior deeply rooted in societal life").
This default system of community property is termed a "legal system," to distinguish it from a
"conventional system" of community property which arises not by operation of law, but by "agreement
between [the spouses] that the marital property shall be held in some form of community." See de
Funiak & Vaughn, supra note 24, § 54, at 92-93 (noting that "[t]he conventional community is thus to
be distinguished from the legal community which arises by operation of law upon the marriage of the
parties"). Unlike Louisiana, which has always had a legal system of community property, Oklahoma
and Oregon initially adopted conventional community property systems. See id. § 54, at 93 n.6.
201. Litvinoff, supra note 199, § 1.6, at 12. Professor Litvinoffnotes that Pothier recognized in
the eighteenth century that "there are some obligations of which either natural or positive law is the
immediate and only source... which [do] not arise from any contract made by the person bound but
[are] wholly imposed directly by the law without regard to that person's will." See id. (citing I Pothier,
A Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts 73 (Evans transl. 1806)). Put another way,
community property obligations arise from the juridical fact of marriage ("an event which, by itself,
brings about legal effects"), rather than from any "juridical act" (a"manifestation of will meant to have
legal effects"). See LevassCur, supra note 158, at 6.
1999]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The first is that an author-spouse arguably "consents" to the effects of the legal
regime simply by living in a community property jurisdiction as a married person.
But a similar argument could be made that all persons in Louisiana "consent" to all
duties imposed by law, whether by criminal law, tort law or family law.2"2 If
credited, this argument would effectively obliterate the distinction made by the
legislature in differentiating obligations that arise from "declarations of will," and
those that arise from "the law."203 Indeed, although positive law is the ultimate
source of all legal obligations, our Civil Code recognizes the fundamental
distinction between those that arise from declarations of will and those that do
not.2"4 Therefore, the mere fact that an author-spouse may be subject to the legal
regime because he is a married person domiciled in Louisiana simply does not
mean that he "consented" to it.205
The second rejoinder is that an author-spouse arguably "consents" to the
effects of the community property system simply by not opting out of the legal
regime. Granted, a person can avoid some or all of the effects of the legal regime
through a valid matrimonial agreement.'a 6 And granted, some people voluntarily
enter into such matrimonial agreements and thereby opt out of the community
property regime.2"7 However, both on an institutional level and an individual level,
202. See W. David Slawson, The Futile Searchfor PrinciplesforDefault Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc.
U. 29, 35 (1993) (noting that the claim that "people consent to default rules every time they make a
contract that does not preempt them... to include the traffic laws and the laws of tort shows at once
its absurdity .... Consent spread so thin is meaningless.").
203. See La. Civ. Code art. 1757. On the practical importance of this distinction, see Litvinoff,
supra note 199, § 1.6, at 14.
204. See Litvinoff, supra note 199, § 1.6, at 12-14 (citing 2 Savatier, Cours de droit civil 41-43
(1949)).
205. By analogy, when a court in a contract case seeks to fill an unprovided-for gap in the parties'
agreement, the court cannot resolve the issue "on the basis of the agreement-that is, of contract as
promise." Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 60 (198 1). When
spouses have never agreed to live under a community property system, but the law nonetheless imposes
such a system by default, the resulting rights and obligations cannot fairly be said to arise from the
spouses "agreement." Thanks to Professor Sa6l Litvinoff for his thoughts on this issue.
206. See La. Civ. Code art. 2329. For this reason, the community property regime is largely one
of "default rules" that the parties can contract around, rather than "immutable rules" that they cannot
alter. See, e.g.. Mary Moers Wenig, Taxing Marriage, 6 S. Cal. Rev. L & Women's Stud. 561, 568
(1997) ("Community property is the default rule that can be opted out of by agreement before the
marriage or, for most of the community property states, at any time during marriage."). On the
distinction between default rules and immutable rules, see [an Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale LJ. 87 (1989). Civilian
analogues to the terms "default rules" and "immutable rules," are, respectively, "suppletive rules" and
"imperative rules." See, e.g., E.L. Bums Co., Inc., 302 So. 2d 297,300 (La. 1974) ("(a] suppletive rule
... applies only if those affected by it have not excluded its application"); Picard v. Picard, 708 So. 2d
1292, 1294 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998); Alejandro M. Garro, Codification Technique and the Problem of
Imperative and Suppletive Laws, 41 La. L Rev. 1007 (1981); see also Dana Patrick Karam, Student
Symposium, Conflict of Laws-Contracts, 47 La. L Rev. 1 181, 1185 (1987) ("suppletive laws may be
said to apply in default of an appropriate contractual expression").
207. Perhaps this is all the more likely given that Louisiana law mandates that marriage-license
applicants shall receive "a printed summary of the then current matrimonial regime laws of this state."
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the mere fact that a person fails to opt out of the regime does not mean that he has
thereby "consented" to its effects.
On an institutional level, Louisiana's community property system is a default
regime that does not even purport to be theoretically rooted, like many default
rules,"' in hypothetical consent manifested in a hypothetical bargain." That is, the
Louisiana Legislature did not embrace this default regime after determining that
community property was the regime that most couples would choose anyway. 1'
Rather, the legislature adopted this default system because it believed that the
community property partnership model was the fairest means by which to allocate
and to manage the property of married persons."' Because Louisiana's default
regime does not reflect the considered legislative judgment that "most couples
would have consented to it anyway," to infer a spouse's "consent" to the regime
from the mere fact that he is subject to it would be inappropriate at an institutional
level.2"2
On an individual level, there are innumerable reasons short of unbridled
"consent" why an individual author-spouse in any given case may have failed to opt
out of the legal regime: he may have been ignorant of the community property
regime or its effects on the ownership of copyrighted works when he became
See La. R.S. 9:237(A) (1991); Bix, supra, note 183. at 195 (Louisiana is the "one state in fifty" that
requires the distribution of such information to marrying couples).
208. The recent commentary on the substance of default rules, particularly in contract law, is
extensive. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, The Richness of Contract Law: An Analysis and Critique of
Contemporary Theories of Contract Law (1997); lan Ayers, Making a Difference: The Contractual
Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischell, 59 U. Chi. L Rev. 1391 (1992); Ayers & Gertner, supra
note 206; Randy E. Barnett. The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L
Rev. 821 (1992); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and
Disclosure Rules In Contract.Law, 12 Harv. Ji.L & Pub. Pol'y 639 (1989); Jason Scott Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615 (1990);
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 608 (1998);
see also Bix, supra note 183, at 175-76. See generally Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. I (1993).
209. See Bix, supra note 183, at 175 (contract law "default rules usually reflect either the terms
parties most likely would choose in any event-and therefore the ones that are most likely to reflect
particular parties' actual intentions or the terms considered the fairest to the parties").
210. Moreover, even if Louisiana's default community property system were grounded in the
hypothetical-bargain rationale, "[hjypothetical consent is not consent; none of the reasons why actual
consent creates obligations are available when consent is only hypothetical." See Steven J. Burton,
Default Principles. Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. Cal. lnterdisc. L. 115, 120
(1993); David Chamey, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation,
89 Mich. L Rev. 1815, 1833 (1991) (a default rule based on a hypothetical bargain is "hypothetical
precisely because the transactor has made no explicit prior choice"); see also J.P. Kostritsky, "Why
Infer"?: What the New Institutional Economics Has to Say About Law Supplied Default Rules, 73 Tul.
L. Rev. 497, 510-16 (1998) (discussing the problems associated with equating "hypothetical consent"
to true consent in the context of default rules).
211. E.g., de Funiak &Vaughn, supranote 24, § 11.1, at 24.
212. More generally, the theory that default rules are "based on the parties' consent has long been
thought to be pure fiction." See Barnett, supra note 208, at 822-23; see also Coleman et al., supra note
208, at 639 (arguing that consent to a contract does not mean consent to default rules).
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subject to the regime; he may have chosen not to opt for irrational reasons;214 he
may have yearned to opt out, but did not pursue the matter because the associated
transaction costs were too high;2 11 or he may have actually sought to opt out, but
was rebuffed in his attempt to do so by other actors whose consent or approval was
also required, namely his spouse or a judge (if judicial approval was necessary).' 6
Given that Section 201 (e) flatly prohibits nearly all involuntary transfers when the
"individual author's ownership ... has not previously been transferred voluntarily
by that individual author," ' the peculiar circumstances surrounding each
"individual author's" failure to opt out of the legal regime are critically important
213. See Barnett, supra note 208, at 866 (silence in the face of a default rule may not constitute
"consent" to that rule if the parties did not know of the rule); id. at 898; Bix, supra note 183, at 195 ("it
is far from clear that most people entering a marriage even knew [community property] rules from the
beginning"); Id. at 195-99 (to consent voluntarily one must have "full information about the
consequences of the choice and the alternatives available").
214. See Gregory S. Alexander, The New Marriage Contract and the Limits of Private Ordering,
73 Ind. Li. 503, 508 (1998) (many do not enter into marriage contracts as a result of "the notorious
assumption of newlyweds that their marriage will be among the fifty percent of marriages that work
..... "); Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions
and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 439 (1993); Bix, supra
note 183, at 193 ("there are particular situations and circumstances in which parties are particularly
unlikely to act in a rational way, and the law ... should respond to that reality"); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 216-17 (1995)
(persons "often fail to make rational decisions even within the bounds of the information they have
acquired"); id. at 254-58 (the "limits of cognition" and "[b]ounded rationality" call into question the
degree to which marrying spouses freely and voluntarily consent to prenuptial agreements); Ann Laquer
Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 Win. & Mary L. Rev.
989,1016-22 (1995) (discussing the problems with applying rational-choice theory in context of family
law); Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey E. Stake, Lirting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage
Contract, 73 Ind. L.J. 453, 461 (1998) ("most people think their marriages will not fail").
215. See Barnett, supra note 208, at 866 ("In the presence of rules that are costly to... contract
around, silence is highly ambiguous. It may or may not signify consent to the imposition of the default
rule."); Korobkin, supra note 208, at 675 (parties sometimes fail to contract around default rules
"because of high transactions costs"); Eyal Zamir, he Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation,
97 Colum. L Rev. 1710,1755-59 (1997) ("the very existence of a default rule... imposes additional
costs on parties wishing to lay down a contrary or different term in their contract"). The relational costs
associated with contracting around default community property rules are, perhaps obviously, very high
given that spouses or spouses-to-be do not want to risk transaction breakdown. See Lisa Bernstein,
Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. Cal. lnterdisc. LJ. 59, 73 n.45 (1993) ("Marriage is an
example of a contracting context where the relational costs of varying default rules (such as community
property or equitable distribution) through a prenuptial agreement may be particularly high."); id. at 69
("[r]elational factors ... have a strong influence on parties' perceptions of the benefits of contracting
around legal default rules"); Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 214, at 461 (few people circumvent default
rules of marriage "because initiating negotiations would send a pessimistic signal to a fianet(e) or
spouse"); Zamir, supra, at 1756-57 (the "mere suggestion by one party to contract around the ordinary
rules may raise suspicion").
216. Under the Civil Code, a matrimonial agreement opting out of or terminating the legal regime
cannot be effected unilaterally. On the contrary, prior to marriage the consent of both spouses is
required for such an agreement. During marriage, not only is mutual consent required, but also court
approval. See La. Civ. Code art. 2329.
217. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1996) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 60
DANES. CIOLINO
to the issue of whether that "individual author" has thereby consented to a
subsequent involuntary transfer of his copyright.2 ' For these reasons, it would be
manifestly inappropriate to infer such consent generally from an author-spouse's
simple failure to opt out of the legal regime.
IV. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR THE STATUS Quo
For the reasons discussed above, copyrights vest during the legal regime solely
in the author-spouse and are never transferred by operation of Louisiana law to the
community patrimonial mass. Given that copyrights are not community property,
should Congress reform federal copyright law to accommodate state family law?
Such reform would appear to be justified by two postulated problems, namely, that
the status quo leads both to allocative inefficiencies and to a fundamentally unfair
distribution of property as between married persons.
This Part addresses these problems and ultimately concludes they are illusory.
As discussed below, separate ownership of copyrights inflicts minimal harm to the
interests protected by community property law and, on the contrary, furthers some
of those interests. Moreover, any attempt to reconcile federal copyright law and
state community property law would require Congress to overhaul several
fundamental provisions of the Copyright Act in a manner that would exceed
Congress' constitutional authority under the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.
One possible problem with granting the author-spouse all rights in copyrighted
works is that doing so may discourage the author-spouse from investing his
resources in alternative endeavors." 9 After all, a day spent creating a copyrighted
work will yield something owned solely by him, while a day spent earning wages
of equal (or even greater) value will yield something that he must share.20 Because
this incentive structure could cause the author-spouse to channel his labor and
capital to lower-valued uses, namely, the creation of copyrighted works, it
conceivably could result in an inefficient allocation of resources."' Although this
effect is conceivable, there is simply no evidence, empirical or anecdotal,
suggesting that a significant number of married persons actually allocate their
scarce resources with a view toward maximizing individual wealth in the uncertain
contingency that their marriages will fail.222
218. See Bix, supra note 183, at 199 (the extent to which parties have established a matrimonial
regime with "full rationality, consent or voluntariness is not entirely clear, and it is likely to vary from
party to party in different fact situations").
219. Analogously, the United States Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210,234.
101 S. Ct. 2728,2742 (1981), noted that "[tlhe value of retired pay as an inducement for enlistment or
re-enlistment is obviously diminished to the extent that the service member recognizes that he or she
may be involuntarily transferred to a State that will divide that pay upon divorce."
220. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand.
L Rev. 483, 582 (1996) ("an investor's decision to make one investment rather than another will
depend upon the... return she expects to cam on the available investments").
221. On the role of allocative efficiency in copyright, see id.
222. Most spouses (somewhat irrationally) believe that their marriages will not fail. See, e.g.,
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Another possible problem with granting the author-spouse all rights in
copyrighted works is that doing so is simply unfair. The community property
system exists largely to further spousal equality' by financially acknowledging the
contributions made by each spouse."2' Permitting an author-spouse to retain sole
ownership of copyrighted works created during marriage is arguably unfair because
it discounts the endeavors of his nonauthor partner.
Furthermore, this perceived problem is aggravated by the inability of the
nonauthor spouse to obtain reimbursement for the value added to the author-spouse's
separate patrimony through his authorship. Louisiana Civil Code article 2368
typically entities a spouse to receive from the other' one-half of the increase in value
of the other spouse's separate property when the increase is attributable to the
uncompensated or under-compensated labor or industry of the other spouse.' This
reimbursement exists largely to "discourag[e] a spouse from depriving the community
of his salary to increase the value of his separate property."' 7 However, this
reimbursement is unavailable when the under-compensated spousal labor takes the
form of under-compensated authorship of copyrighted works. After all, to give a
nonauthor spouse a monetary claim against the author for a share of the value of an
author's copyrighted work would essentially end-run federal copyright law and give
the nonauthor a share of the financial rewards of authorship. Because copyright law
exists to generate such financial rewards to spur authorship,' any state-law
reimbursement claims for a portion of these federally-created incentives would be
preempted by copyright law.' 9
Nayo, supra note 14, at 167; supra note 214 and accompanying text.
223. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.2, at 47 ("From the earliest times, the most
important legislative policy underpinning the Louisiana community property regime has been that
spouses share equally 'the produce of the reciprocal labor and industzy of both husband and wife."').
224. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 14, at 1059 (goal of community property is to "recognize in
economic terms the contribution of nonbreadwinner spouses").225. The funds to satisfy a reimbursement claim may be drawn either from the other spouse's net
share of the former community property or, with limited exceptions, from the other spouse's separate
property. See. e.g., Roque v. Tate, 631 So. 2d 1385 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994); Fastabend v. Fastabend,
606 So. 2d 794 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992). See generally Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 7.13, at
379.
226. See La. Civ. Code art. 2368. See generally Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 7.18.
227. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 7.18, at 415.
228. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Part I.C.; see also PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 877(Cal. 1996) (state law cannot regulate transfers of copyright ownership in a manner that conflicts withfederal law). Indeed, in past cases in which federal law was held to preempt state marital property law
as to property ownership, no spouse has been permitted to end-run federal preemption through a state-
law reimbursement claim for a portion of the value of the property classified by federal law as separate.
See, e.g., Succession of Harrell, 622 So. 2d 253, 255-56 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993) (no reimbursement
claim exists for "one-half the value of the bonds classified as separate by federal law"). See generally
Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.42, at 150 (observing that in Free v. Bland, "ft]he surviving
husband was recognized as owner of the bonds with no obligation to reimburse the wife's separate
estate for her interest in the community funds that had now been transmuted into his separate property")(discussing Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S. Ct. 1089 (1962)).
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Although this perceived unfairness is perhaps an understandable effect of
Louisiana's deep-rooted community property tradition, classifying copyrights as
separate property not only inflicts minimal harm to the interests protected by
community property law, but also furthers those interests. The minimal nature of
such harm becomes apparent upon considering that other valuable things derived
from or associated with the author's separate copyrights are community property
under Louisiana law and likely are unaffected by federal copyright law. For
example, revenues derived from the licensing of a separately-owned copyrighted
work during marriage are "civil fruits"2 ' of that work, and as such, are classified
by Louisiana law as community property."' Similarly, the material objects
embodying copyrighted works232 are community property when comprised of
significantly valuable community materials.3 And the proceeds derived from the
230. La. Civ. Code art. 551 ("Fruits are things that are... derived from another thing without
diminution of its substance.... Civil fruits are revenues derived from a thing by operation of law or
by reason of ajuridical act, such as rentals, interest, and certain corporate distributions."). See generally
Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.7. Whether revenues derived from ganting exclusive licenses
in separately-owned copyrighted works should be classified as fruits (in which case such revenues may
be community property, see id. art. 2339), or products (in which case such revenues would.clearly be
separate property, see id. art. 488 & art. 2341, cmt. c) is a more interesting issue. Because copyrighted
works are inexhaustible "public goods," see, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in
Copyright, 48 Emory L.J. 1, 42-43 (1999); William W. Fischer, Ill, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1661,1700 (1988) ("Unlike most goods and services, [works of intellect]
can be used and enjoyed by unlimited numbers of persons without being 'used up."'), the exclusive
licensing of a copyrighted work likely does not result in the "diminution of its substance," at least as
that concept likely was contemplated by the drafters of Article 551. Nevertheless, the granting of an
exclusive license is a "transfer" of copyright, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996) ("transfer of ownership"), and,
as such, deprives the grantor of the ability to exercise the transferred exclusive right(s) and to grant
additional licenses (whether exclusive or nonexclusive). Therefore, it would appear that revenues
obtained from the granting of exclusive licenses or from other copyright "transfers" should be treated
as separately-owned "products" rather than as community-owned "fruits."
231. See La. Civ. Code art. 2339. See generally Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.6 ("[fruits
of a spouse's separate property, under Article 2339, are ... community"). Note that under the
Louisiana Civil Code a "spouse may reserve [civil fruits] as his separate property by a declaration made
in an authentic act or in an act under private signature duly acknowledged." La. Civ. Code art. 2339.
Such a declaration is effective "when filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which
the declarant is domiciled." Id.
A good argument could be made, however, that Louisiana is foreclosed from classifying such
proceeds as community property by the Copyright Act and the Supremacy Clause. Particularly, such
classification may interfere with the financial incentives for authorship that Congress intended to
facilitate through enacting the Copyright Act of 1976. See supra Part ll.C.2.b.
232. Under the Copyright Act, "[o]wnership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under
a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied." 17
U.S.C. § 202 (1996).
233. In other words, a material object fixing an intangible copyrighted work is communityproperty
if the object is made up of community things that have a value that is consequential in relation to the
value of the copyright that the object fixes. See La. Civ. Code art. 2342 ("The separate property of a
spouse. . . comprises: ... property acquired.., with separate and community things when the value
of the community things is inconsequential in comparison with the value of the separate things
used....").
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sale of such tangible artifacts would likewise be community under real subrogation
principles." 4 Thus, many paintings, prints, phonorecords, manuscripts and other
such corporeal objects produced by the author-spouse during the legal regime, as
well as the proceeds obtained from the sale of such tangible objects, are likely
community property under current state law. Considering that many artists derive
a significant portion of their income from the sale of tangible artifacts, the
monetary gains associated with a spouse's creation of works of authorship are often
shared during marriage. '2
In addition, separate copyright ownership furthers the interest of allowing
spouses to go their own ways after marriage without nettlesome property-related
entanglements. Indeed, Louisiana law distinctly recognizes this interest not only
statutorily-through legislation expressly providing that post-termination wages are
the separate property of the wage-earner 36 -but also jurisprudentially-through
cases holding that professional goodwill 37 is "an extrapatrimonial personal
attribute not subject to sharing."'" As Planiol observed, the value of a copyright,
like the value of a professional practice, is inextricably intertwined with the
reputation of a particular individual. 9 For exanple, the copyright in a work by
Degas depicting a ballet dancer is undoubtedly more valuable than the copyright
in an identical work created independently by an unknown artist working in
Jackson Square. If Degas had painted his first ballerina while married and while
domiciled in New Orleans, and if he were still alive today, separate copyright
234. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 488. See generally Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 3.7, at
63 (the proceeds obtained when a thing is sold "are a return ofcapital under a real subrogation theory").
235. See Roberts, supra note 14. at 1072 (opining that "nonauthor spouses are protected adequately
by granting a community property interest in the income derived from copyrights"). Although this is
true under Louisiana community property law, which follows the Spanish system in classifying the
fruits of separate property as community, it would not be so under the community property laws of
California, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico and Washington, which classify the fruits of separate
property as separate property. See generally I Matthew Bender, supra note 14, § 20.03[3](b](], at 20-
63 to 20-64; de Funiak & Vaughn, supra note 24, § 71, at 160-62; see also Nimmer, supra note 14, at
390 (noting that under California law "royalties and profits received from property have the same
character as the property").
236. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2338, 2344. See generally Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 2.8.
Likewise, underpresent Spanish community property law, income attributable to copyright exploitation
falls into the marital community only when "earned during the marriage." See Alberto Bercovitz,
Germin Bercovitz & Milagros del Corral, Spain, in I International Copyright Law& Practice § 4[2][a],
at 34 (Paul E. Geller ed. 1998).
237. Professional goodwill represents "primarily the future return to the professional practitioner
for the exercise of skill and labor." Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 2.8, at 39.
238. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 2.8, at 40; see. e.g., Chance v. Chance, 694 So. 2d 613,
617 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Preis v. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994); McCarron v.
McCarron, 498 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Pearce v. Pearce, 482 So. 2d 108, II1 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1986); Depner v. Depner, 478 So. 2d 532,533 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Taylor v. Taylor,
473 So. 2d 867, 870 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
239. See Planiol, supra note 24, no. 917, at 97 ( "The rights of author are simply a monopoly of
exploitation. As such they are merely part of the exercise ofhis profession. Hence, they should remain
in separate ownership.") (emphasis added).
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ownership would assure that he could create derivative works and exploit the
reputation-dependent value of such works for himself alone.
If, however, copyrights in works created during marriage were considered to
be community property, then a myriad of intractable problems would arise
regarding works created by an author after termination of his marriage. First, it
would be difficult to determine as a threshold matter whether an ex-spouse's post-
termination work is derivative or wholly-original. This difficulty arises because a
nonderivative work created in an author's peculiar style may appear to be an
adaptation purely as a result of stylistic similarities.2" For example, because
Degas' later ballerina works were created by the same artist, painting the same
subject matter, in the same style as many of his earlier works, it is difficult to
discern whether Degas' later paintings are wholly original or merely adaptations
of his earlier works. Although this issue usually is irrelevant, when an author co-
owns the original copyright with another person, the creation of a derivative work
triggers an obligation to account to his co-owner for a share of the profits
attributable to the subsequent use of the co-owned work. 4' Therefore, if Degas co-
owned the copyrights in his early ballerina paintings with his ex-wife, it would be
extremely difficult to determine whether his subsequent works were wholly-
original or merely derivative, and thus, whether he had a duty to account to her for
a share of the profits earned through his adaptation of the earlier works.
Second, as to post-termination works that were clearly derivative, it would be
difficult to distinguish (for purposes of interspousal accounting) between the profits
generated by the community copyright from those generated by other factors.'t Such
"other" factors might include: (1) the reputation of the author, (2) the post-
termination contributions of expression, labor and capital by the author and others to
create and to market the derivative work, (3) the value of the tangible artifact qua
artifact embodying the derivative work, and (4) market factors, among innumerable
other things. 43 For example, if Degas created a ballerina painting after divorce that
240. See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630(9th Cir. 1984); Shapiro, Bernstein &Co. v. Jerry Vogel
Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955); Ninmcr & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 6.12[A], at 6-34.1 ("a
joint owner is under a duty to account to the other joint owners of the work for a ratable share of the
profits realized from his use of the work"); see also Cary, supra note 118, at 96.
242. See Walker v. Forbes, Inc., 28 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp.. 309 U.S. 390, 60 S. Ct. 681 (1940); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir.
1992)).
243. For a discussion of the difficulties associated with deriving and apportioning net profits in
the analogous context of copyright infringement, see Ciolino, supra note 230, at 17-25.
Note that similar problems would arise in quantifying Article 2368 reimbursement claims if such
claims were not preempted by federal copyright law. This is so because any increases in the value of
a copyright that are attributable to factors other than the author-spouse's under-compensated labor are
not subject to a claim for reimbursement. See La. Civ.Code art. 2368; Beals v. Fontenot, IIl F.2d 956,
959 (5th Cir. 1940) (no reimbursement due if increase in value is due to "the ordinary course of things"
or "the rise in the value of the property and chances of trade"); see also Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La.
78. 87 So. 2d 735,738 (1956). See generally Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 7.18, at 419 ("The
most difficult proof required of the claimant spouse under Article 2368 is that the increase in value of
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was an adaptation of an earlier one created during marriage, and then he sold that
derivative work for a profit, a court would be faced with the difficult task of
segregating the profits attributable to the earlier community copyright from those
attributable to other factors such as Degas' artistic reputation, the subsequent
expression he added, the labor invested by him and others to create and market the
adaptation, the raw materials fixing the work, the capital and overhead necessary to
create and to market the work, the value of the signed-by-the-artist painting qua
tangible artifact," and factors peculiar to the relevant art market. These are the sorts
of problems that community property law seeks to avoid by, among other things,
classifying reputation-dependent professional good will as separate property."5
For all of these reasons, there are no compelling reasons why Congress should
reform federal copyright law to accommodate Louisiana and the few other American
community propertyjurisdictions. On the contrary, there are persuasive reasons why
it should not attempt to make this accommodation. As discussed previously,2"
permitting state community property law to govern the ownership and management
of copyrights would frustrate many of the goals underlying Congress' 1976 overhaul
of American copyright law. Moreover, reconciling copyright law and community
property law would require a comprehensive structural reexamination of the
Copyright Act. In addition to rethinking fundamental principles of authorship, initial
vesting, and transfer of ownership, 7 Congress would have to reconsider provisions
relating to visual artists' rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 4 and to
the termination of copyright transfers,1 9 among others.
separate property is attributable to a spouse's labor.") (emphasis in original).
244. This value cannot be understated. "An original drawing... is more valuable than the finest
reproduction, even one all but indistinguishable from it." Leonard B. Meyer, Forgery and the
Anthropology ofArt, in The Forger's Art: Forgery and the Philosophy of Art 77, 86-87 (Denis Dutton
ed., 1983). This is so because of the deontological importance of the pedigree of a physical artifact.
See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 33, 76-77 (1997). A recent example of this phenomenon is the value placed on the original film
of the John F. Kennedy assassination made by Abraham Zapruder in 1963. Arbitrators valued the
physical artifact alone-the 26-second celluloid film-at $16 million dollars, despite that copies of the
film would be virtually indistinguishable from the original stored in the National Archives. See Deb
Riechmann, ZapruderHeirs to Get $16 Millionfor Film, N.O. Times-Picayune, Aug. 4, 1999, at A3.
245. See Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 26, § 2.8.
246. See supra Part lI.C.
247. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201 & 204 (1996).
248. Section 106(A) of the Copyright Act grants only the "author" of a work of visual art the rights
of attribution and integrity. Thus, if Congress were to permit community property states to vest a
copyright in, or transfer a copyright to, a nonauthor spouse, the author-spouse would nonetheless retain
the VARA right to "prevent the use of his or her name as the author ofany work of visual art which he
or she did not create." See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(AXI)(A) (1996). As a result, the author-spouse could
prevent the co-owning nonauthor from using the author's name in connection with any derivative
works. Given the importance of artistic reputation to the economic value of a copyright, this would
seem to undermine substantially the value of the adaptation right in the hands of the nonauthor-spouse.
Presumably, Congress would have to address this issue if it sought to facilitate equal sharing of
copyrights between spouses.
249. Section 203 of the Copyright Act grants only the "author" of a copyrighted work (or, if he is
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Worse still, the legislative end-product of any congressional effort to promote the
spousal sharing of the spoils of authorship would likely be unconstitutional. The
Copyright Clause empowers Congress, "To Promote the Progress of Science ... by
securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings.""s
If Congress attempted to vest copyright ownership in nonauthor-spouses, it arguably
would be exceeding the limited power conferred upon it by the Clause: to grant
exclusive rights only to "[a]uthors.""' Moreover, in enacting legislation to facilitate
spousal copyright sharing, Congress essentially would be curtailing the rights of
authors in furtherance of family-law interests. Such legislation would be unusual
indeed, particularly considering that traditional limitations on authors' rights exist to
increase the volume of authorship to which the public has access." 2 Therefore, while
the goal of public-access typically tethers limitations on authors' rights to the
Copyright Clause's utilitarian principles, no similar anchor exists in the Clause for
federal marital-property legislation.
In conclusion, federal copyright law vests ownership of all copyrights
exclusively in the author-spouse. In so doing, federal law preempts contrary
Louisiana law that purports to vest copyright ownership in both spouses in the
community. So it is. And so it should-and must-remain.
dead, certain survivors of the author) the right to terminate a copyright transfer thirty-five years after
execution of the grant. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp. 1999). In order truly to equalize the value of
copyrights to both spouses, Congress would have to address this provision.
250. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
251. Id. For a discussion of the constitutional problems associated with expanding the notion of
authorship, see Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 14, § 1.061C], at 1-66.21 to 1-66.22; Nimmer, supra
note 14, at 407 (arguing that there would be no constitutional problem if Congress vested copyright in
the author-spouse, and then permitted states to thereafter transfer the copyright to the nonauthor-
spouse).
252. For example, the fair-use limitation exists to increase the number of works of authorship
available to the public, thus furthering the utilitarian goals undergirding the Copyright Clause. See
Ciolino, supra note 244, at 72-74.
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